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Abstract 
Competitive democratic theory predicts that electoral factors enhance responsiveness to public 
opinion. Yet findings on the effects of electoral incentives on policy responsiveness point in different 
directions and comparative research remains limited, lacking of a systematic evaluation. We draw on 
previous work, expand the range of electoral incentives, and re-assess their role in influencing policy 
responsiveness by using spending preferences. We provide extensive tests of an Electoral 
Vulnerability Hypothesis and an Electoral Proximity Hypothesis. Contra competitive democratic 
theory, time-series analysis from Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States in twenty policy 
domains and nine different indicators for electoral incentives finds limited support for these 
hypotheses. Our findings have implications for democracy and question the importance of electoral 
pressures in explaining policy responsiveness. 
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Most research that evaluates the effects of electoral pressures on policy responsiveness to 
public opinion starts with the assumption that electoral incentives enhance responsiveness. 
This assumption invokes the rational anticipation of future elections and implies that policy 
makers seek re-election and hence consider voters’ reactions (e.g., Downs 1957; Strom 1992; 
Stimson et al. 1995; Bartolini 1999; Manin, Przeworski, and Stokes 1999). However, 
comparative research on this topic is limited to the work of Hobolt and Klemmensen (2008) 
and Soroka and Wlezien (2010), while relevant previous studies only marginally touch upon 
electoral incentives and primarily focus on political institutions (e.g., Hobolt and 
Klemmensen 2005; Soroka and Wlezien 2010; Wlezien and Soroka 2012; Soroka and 
Wlezien 2015; Fagan, Jones, and Wlezien 2017). 
We extend research on policy responsiveness to public preferences and consider two 
major electoral incentives: government potential vulnerability and electoral proximity. This is 
important for at least two reasons. First, comparative work on whether electoral vulnerability 
conditions policy responsiveness remains limited to vote marginality (Soroka and Wlezien 
2010) and to how much the Prime Minister party and president are popular in the polls 
(Hobolt and Klemmensen 2008) – a choice followed in single-country studies on Canada 
(Pickup and Hobolt 2015), the United Kingdom (Hakhverdian 2010) and the United States 
(Canes-Wrone 2004) – whereas the electoral proximity effect is better explored in the study of 
American presidents than elsewhere (e.g., Cohen 1997; Canes-Wrone and Shotts 2004). 
Second, not only previous comparative studies are scant, but their findings point in 
different directions and are not easily comparable because they use different measures for 
electoral pressures and public opinion. For instance, whereas Soroka and Wlezien (2010) use 
public preferences and a more static measure of vote margin, Hobolt and Klemmensen (2008) 
use public priorities and a more dynamic measure of government popularity. 
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Hence, we still lack of a systematic assessment of the impact of electoral incentives on 
policy responsiveness to public preferences across country and over time, and the above 
considerations prompt us to re-evaluate two hypotheses: the Electoral Vulnerability 
Hypothesis and the Electoral Proximity Hypothesis. According to these hypotheses, we 
should expect policy to be more likely to respond to public preferences when the government 
is vulnerable and when elections are approaching. 
This paper tests these hypotheses using time-series analysis on spending in twenty 
policy domains across Canada, the United Kingdom and the Unites States. We employ nine 
different indicators of electoral incentives and find limited evidence that electoral incentives 
condition budgetary policy responsiveness. We find that when they occur these effects are 
generally small and mostly enhance rather than generate policy responsiveness and mostly 
materialise for issues that are important to the public. These results have implications for 
democracy and for applications to policy responsiveness of theories driven by party 
competition. 
Our finding that electoral vulnerability and, especially, electoral proximity do not 
exert much of an impact on policy responsiveness is important for democracy. While previous 
work shows that spending responds to public preferences (e.g., Soroka and Wlezien 2010; 
Jennings and Wlezien 2015), our finding of limited evidence that this relationship is 
conditional on electoral incentives suggests that budgetary responsiveness is not much 
motivated by short-term re-election strategies. We believe this is good news for democracy, 
for the connection between what the public wants and what the government provides is more 
of a direct one. Our findings thereby suggest that we should not overestimate the role of 
elections in this regard and that party competition-driven theories might be more successful in 
explaining responsiveness in more rhetorical and symbolic policy venues, such as executive 
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speeches, election manifestos and other party communications, instead of more substantive 
policy venues like spending. 
The paper proceeds as follows. We develop our theoretical expectations in the next 
section. Then, we introduce the data, measures and methods. Next, we present our results and 
then discuss our conclusions and their implications for future research. 
 
Theoretical Expectations 
Policy makers tend to respond to public preferences on issues that are important to the public 
(e.g., Miller and Stokes 1963; Page and Shapiro 1983; Burstein 1998, 2003; Hobolt and 
Klemmensen 2005, 2008; Soroka and Wlezien 2010). This is arguably the most remarkable 
finding from the policy responsiveness literature.1 Following the thermostatic model of public 
responsiveness and policy representation (Wlezien 1995), the responsiveness mechanism 
would function as follows: “where the public notices and responds to policy in a particular 
domain, policy makers would notice and respond to public preferences themselves; where the 
public does not respond to policy, policy makers would not represent public preferences” 
(Soroka and Wlezien 2005, 668; see also Wlezien 2004). In other words, the responsiveness 
mechanism implies policy feedback, which is “critical to the ongoing functioning of a 
political system” (Soroka and Wlezien 2010, 15; see also Easton 1965). A great deal of 
research on policy feedback shows that policy significantly influences public opinion (e.g., 
Pierson 1993), and that policy effects depend on the relative specificity and visibility of 
government programmes (e.g., Page and Jacobs 2009). 
                                                
1 This finding is backed up by consistent cross-country evidence on policy agendas that policy 
makers’ attention follows or is congruent with public issue priorities (Jones and Baumgartner 
2004; Jennings and John 2009; Chaqués Bonafont and Palau 2011; John, Bevan, and Jennings 
2011; Lindeboom 2012; Bevan and Jennings 2014; Visconti 2018). 
 4 
Competitive democratic theory posits that electoral incentives enhance policy makers’ 
responsiveness to public opinion, because policy makers would be primarily driven by re-
election desires (e.g., Downs 1957; Strom 1992; Stimson et al. 1995; Bartolini 1999; Manin, 
Przeworski, and Stokes 1999).2 Interestingly, comparative work on the conditional impact of 
electoral pressures on policy responsiveness is still limited and lacks of a systematic 
examination. In their study on Britain, Denmark and the United States, Hobolt and 
Klemmensen (2008) show that, in line with competitive democratic theory, electoral pressures 
matter for policy responsiveness and governments respond to the public when they are 
unpopular. Their study is the first comparative work that explores the effects of electoral 
pressures on policy responsiveness. 
However, due to the difficulty of collecting data on public preferences, to measure 
public opinion Hobolt and Klemmensen (2008) relied on data on public priorities. This 
approach clashes with more recent evidence suggesting that public issue priorities do not 
influence government expenditures (Bevan and Jennings 2014; Jennings and Wlezien 2015) 
and concludes that ‘spending is not responsive to public concern about the “most important 
problem” in contrast to relative preferences’ (Bevan and Jennings 2014, 52; but see Wlezien 
2005). The reason why public priorities would not have an impact on spending is that, since 
budgets have directional implications, changes in the most important problem/issue question 
are not directional, that is, the public cannot signal whether it wants more or less spending on 
a given policy domain (Jennings and Wlezien 2015). Hence, priorities are not seen as a good 
measure for policy responsiveness. 
                                                
2 However, note that re-election is not the only goal that parties would follow (Strom 1990) 
and that governing parties have intrinsic preferences over the policies they enact (see, e.g., 
Wittman 1977, 1983). 
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In light of the above criticisms against the use of public priorities when studying 
budgetary responsiveness, we believe it is worth testing again the effects of electoral 
pressures on policy responsiveness using available comparative data on public preferences. A 
first attempt was found in Soroka and Wlezien’s (2010, 137-140) Degrees of Democracy, 
where the authors operationalize electoral incentives as vote margin, that is, the percentage of 
votes by which a government holds a majority. We start from here and propose a more 
systematic test on two main electoral incentives: government potential vulnerability during 
the election cycle, which refers to the electoral uncertainty governments face between 
elections, and electoral proximity, which refers to the pressure governments face when 
elections are approaching. Interestingly, while previous comparative work referred to the 
former, we are not aware of comparative research on the latter. 
Below we present a discussion of these two concepts derived from previous theoretical 
and empirical research that emphasises the positive influence of electoral factors in enhancing 
responsiveness. 
 
Electoral Vulnerability 
The conditional effect of government vulnerability on policy responsiveness builds on 
Friedrich’s (1963) notable ‘mechanism of anticipated reactions’. That is, if governments aim 
to be re-elected, they will be more likely to reach this goal if they respond sympathetically to 
citizens’ demands (Bartolini 1999; Downs 1957). Only if politicians are worried about the 
reactions of voters will they be ‘constantly piloted by the anticipation of those reactions’ 
(Sartori 1977, 350). This mechanism will perform better if incumbents perceive themselves 
vulnerable (Mayhew 1974; Fenno 1977). Strom (1989; but see also Strom 1992) calls this 
mechanism performance sensitivity, while Bartolini (2000) uses the term incumbent 
vulnerability. 
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With the exception of Soroka and Wlezien (2010), who relied on vote marginality and 
found very limited effects on policy responsiveness,3 empirical research, both from the United 
States and comparatively, has been using measures of government popularity in order to test 
the Electoral Vulnerability Hypothesis. If measurement issues will be addressed in the 
following section, what matters here is government’s potential vulnerability during the 
electoral cycle, for responsiveness occurs between elections. Empirical research finds mixed 
evidence that popularity influences responsiveness. Some studies report no particular impact 
of presidential popularity on responsiveness to public concern (Cohen 1995) and that 
‘unpopular presidents are not more likely than popular ones to support positions endorsed by 
majority opinion’ (Canes-Wrone 2004, 487). Other studies show that more popular presidents 
do feel less pressure to promote policies in line with the public (for a review, see Manza and 
Cook 2002) or find support for a nonmonotonic relationship (Canes-Wrone and Shotts 2004).4 
Elsewhere, the hypothesis that popularity increases responsiveness finds support in Britain, 
using Left-Right policy mood (Hakhverdian 2010), Canada, using public priorities on welfare 
                                                
3 Soroka and Wlezien (2010, 139) provided a basic test for the hypothesis on social domains 
combined and found limited evidence of a marginality effect only in the United States (the 
interaction between public preferences and vote margin was statistically significant only at p ≤ 
.10), but not in the United Kingdom and Canada. 
4 Note that, in the United States, the impact of electoral pressures on policy responsiveness 
might be conditional on whether the Presidential party holds a majority in Congress. It might 
be the case that electoral incentives have a greater impact on policy responsiveness in cases of 
unified than divided government, for the President would have freer hands to follow what the 
public wants and the Congressional party may share the incentives of a president to be 
responsive to high salience public concerns (see Coleman 1999; Green and Jennings 2017). 
Unfortunately, our N is too small for fully testing this possibility empirically. 
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(Pickup and Hobolt 2015), and comparatively in the above-mentioned study on public 
priorities by Hobolt and Klemmensen (though the effect varies across policy areas). 
 
Electoral Proximity 
We now consider the other main electoral incentive, known as electoral connection (Mayhew 
1974) or electoral proximity (Canes-Wrone and Shotts 2004). As elections are at the heart of 
democracy (Dahl 1971; Powell 2000) and described as a powerful driver of responsiveness 
(Stimson et al. 1995; Manin et al. 1999; Erikson et al. 2002), their approaching generates an 
incentive for re-election-seeking governments to respond to the public. In fact, when elections 
are closer, politicians will find it faster and less risky to respond to public opinion rather than 
to attempt to change it (e.g., Jacobs and Shapiro 2000). Moreover, because voters are unlikely 
to observe the outcome of a policy choice made shortly before an election, presidents are 
more likely to cater to current opinion as the next election is coming (Canes-Wrone and 
Shotts 2004, 693). 
The Electoral Proximity Hypothesis finds some support in the American presidential 
context, where re-election-seeking presidents are more likely to endorse popular policies in 
the second half of the term (Canes-Wrone and Shotts 2004).5 Yet results are inconsistent (see, 
e.g., Cohen 1997), and evidence from Spain reveals, instead, that policymakers are not more 
responsive to public priorities in the election year but immediately after elections (Chaques 
Bonafont and Palau 2011). Furthermore, other mixed evidence comes from political 
economy. For instance, some work suggests that fiscal policy tends to be systematically 
manipulated before elections (e.g., Persson and Tabellini 2000). While taxes are cut before 
                                                
5 Note that, although less relevant to us, a great deal of work focuses on US legislators’ roll 
call behaviour and, in comparison with the presidential literature, finds wide evidence that 
legislators are more responsive to public opinion in the year they face re-election. 
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elections, painful fiscal adjustments (such as cuts in spending and deficits) are postponed until 
after the elections and this, in turn, depends on institutional differences (Persson and Tabellini 
2002, 4). On the other hand, real economic expansions are not easily detected in OECD 
countries (e.g., Franzese 2002) and, in contrast with the opportunistic political business cycle 
(e.g., Nordhaus 1975; Tufte 1978), some evidence is also found for a reverse electoral 
business cycle, at least with private fixed investment (e.g., Canes-Wrone and Park 2012). Yet 
it is unclear from this research whether spending follows public opinion when elections are 
approaching. 
To sum up, we believe that an empirical (re)assessment of the role played by electoral 
incentives in policy responsiveness is needed because (1) evidence from existing studies 
points in different directions and (2) we lack of a systematic test validated against multiple 
measures. 
 
Data, Measurement, and Model Specification 
We test our theoretical expectations in Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States. 
To the best of our knowledge, these are the only countries for which time-series on public 
opinion’s preferences in spending are publicly available. Notwithstanding, these cases display 
high clarity of responsibility  (e.g., Powell and Whitten 1993) and high electoral 
identifiability (e.g., Shugart and Carey 1992) and have been already employed to test the 
thermostatic model (Soroka and Wlezien 2010). As the policy output would not be the by-
product of a coalition agreement and so governments would face no constraints from coalition 
partners to enact their policies, these cases are appropriate for testing the impact of electoral 
incentives on policy responsiveness. 
Although appropriations would be better than outlays to measure spending (see 
Wlezien and Soroka 2003: 273-4), the former are available for the United States but not for 
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the United Kingdom and Canada, and so we use outlays. Data on government expenditure in 
Canada (we use consolidated spending) come from Statistics Canada and are combined from 
two existing, functionally consistent matrices (for details see Soroka and Wlezien 2010, 82). 
For the United States we rely on outlays measures from the Historical Tables published by the 
Office of Management and Budget. For the United Kingdom we rely on Soroka et al.’s (2006) 
re-recalculations of spending back to 1980. Following Soroka and Wlezien’s (2010, 81) 
explanations, data are combined with two years of earlier data recalculated by HM Treasury 
for Public Expenditure Statistical Analysis. Data were adjusted for inflation. 
Public opinion is measured by using relative preferences in spending. The survey 
question is typically the following: “Do you think the government is spending too much, too 
little or about the right amount on [policy domain]?” These items ask respondents to compare 
their absolute preferences and the policy status quo. Compared to measures of public 
priorities, spending preferences are a better approach to study policy responsiveness, as 
mentioned above. Following Wlezien (1995), we use a measure of net support for spending, 
by subtracting the percentage of people who think the government is spending “too much” 
from the percentage of people who think the government is spending “too little”. This 
measure indicates the degree to which the public wants more (less) spending over time 
(Wlezien 1995, 985). For Canadian data we rely on Environics (and when missing from 
Pollara), for the United Kingdom on Gallup and for the United States on GSS (and Roper for 
missing years). In sum, by combining spending and preferences our data set includes data on 
Canada (1988-2005), the United Kingdom (1978-1995), and the United States (1974-2005) in 
the following policy domains for which both spending and preferences are available: Canada 
(defence, education, environment, health, transport, and welfare), the UK (defence, education, 
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health, pensions, and roads), and the US (cities, crime, defence, education, environment, 
foreign aid, health, space, and welfare).6 
Since responsiveness occurs between elections, to test the Electoral Vulnerability 
Hypothesis we are interested in governments’ dynamic potential vulnerability.7 Thus we 
                                                
6 Data on Canada are downloaded from Soroka and Wlezien’s “Degrees of Democracy: 
Politics, Public Opinion and Policy” Canadian data set available at: 
http://www.degreesofdemocracy.net/data.html. Data on the United Kingdom and the United 
States are downloaded from the Replication data for the Jennings and Wlezien (2015) article 
published in Political Science Research and Methods available at: 
https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.7910/DVN/27496. Due to 
some missing values in the UK and US preferences, we follow Jennings and Wlezien (2015) 
and use interpolated data in our analyses.  
7 Of course other measures exist, but they are either about institutional vulnerability or based 
on aggregate electoral data such as indices of electoral competitiveness, the closeness of 
electoral result, and the frequency of turnover (Schlesinger 1955, 1960; Ranney 1965; Stern 
1972; Meltz 1973; Elkins 1974; Ferejohn 1977; Patterson and Caldeira 1984; Endersby et al. 
2002; Grofman and Selb 2009; Blais and Lago 2009; André, Depaw, Martin 2014; Immergut 
and Abou-Chadi 2014; Abou-Chadi and Orlowski 2016). These kinds of measures are 
problematic when we want to study government responsiveness, for at least three reasons. 
First, we simply are not interested in institutional vulnerability. Second, responsiveness 
occurs not at election time but between elections, therefore using measures based on election 
data would be problematic if not misleading. Third, such measures are time invariant and 
artificially static for the whole election cycle, they are US-specific, measured at the district 
level and not at the national level, or designed for other purposes. It is much better, both from 
a validity and degrees of freedom/variability perspective, to measure potential vulnerability 
 11 
primarily use data on vote intentions to compute our measures of vulnerability.8 Government 
popularity (Hobolt and Klemmensen 2008; Hakhverdian 2010), measured using vote 
intentions for the government, provides the basic test for a measure of dynamic potential 
vulnerability. More recently, Bernardi (2018) built on traditional measures of government 
popularity and developed two measures of dynamic potential vulnerability which have been 
tested in the context of policy agenda responsiveness: Government Potential Vulnerability 
(GPV) and Formateur Potential Vulnerability (FPV). At their basis there is the idea that what 
matters is the level of vulnerability, that is, policy responsiveness is higher the more the 
government is vulnerable. GPV is computed by subtracting for each year the vote intentions 
for the relevant opposition parties from the vote intentions for the governing parties. This 
measure is based on the assumption that governments do not only care about their own 
popularity, but also about how well the opposition is doing at the polls. As considering all 
opposition parties relevant would be misleading, we rely on a quantitative adaptation of 
Sartori’s (1976) criteria of coalition and blackmail potential based on recent studies on 
responsiveness and congruence (Bischof 2018; Bernardi 2018; but see also Lühiste et al 
2017). Hence, the party must fulfill the following criteria: (1) the party must have been in 
                                                                                                                                                   
with survey estimates for each year, rather than using the single value of the posterior 
elections for all the 3-5 years prior to the elections. Note that using measures based on voter’s 
propensity to vote (Kroh et al. 2007; Tillie 1995; van der Eijk and Oppenhuis 1991) would 
not solve our issue since such data come from pre-election surveys and hence not available at 
least on a yearly basis. 
8 Vote intentions data for Canada come from Environics, data for the United Kingdom come 
from different polls available in Wlezien et al. (2013) and Green and Jennings (2012), and 
data for the United States come, again, from different polls available in Jennings and Wlezien 
(2016). 
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government throughout the period of reference or (2) gained at least 5 percent of the votes and 
5 seats in at least two elections. 
FPV builds on the government and coalition formation literature (e.g., Warwick 1996; 
Martin and Stevenson 2001) and accounts for the possibility that what matters is the 
vulnerability of the formateur, i.e., the Prime Minister (PM) party, and that the PM party 
becomes vulnerable when it loses this advantage in favour of another party. Since Canada and 
the United Kingdom are cases of single-party (minority) governments in the periods covered 
in our analysis, the source of vulnerability cannot come from a coalition partner, and so FPV 
is computed by subtracting the vote intentions for the largest opposition party from the vote 
intentions for the PM party.9  
Drawing on our previous work, we develop two more measures of vulnerability, based 
on the possibility that what matters for governments to respond is not that the government (or 
the PM party) is reasonably vulnerable but that the potential electoral outcome is very or 
completely uncertain. We take the concept of uncertainty from early measures of party 
competition (e.g., Elkins 1974) and adapt it for our purposes. That is, what may matter for us 
is that the difference in vote intentions between government and opposition (or PM party and 
largest opposition party) is minimal. We account for this possibility by creating two measures 
based on GPV and FPV, which we label Government Potential Uncertainty (GPU) and 
Formateur Potential Uncertainty (FPU). GPU and FPU are dummy variables that equal one if 
the difference between government (PM party) and relevant opposition (largest opposition 
party) is close to zero – we arbitrarily set a range between -5% and +5% to account for 
sampling error – and equal zero otherwise. 
                                                
9 Being the United States a case of presidentialism with a pure two-party system, the 
formateur argument is clearly less relevant here and the FPV measure would simply be 
identical to the GPV measure. 
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Since it was employed in previous research on government responsiveness as an 
attempt to capture government’s electoral risk, we replicate our analyses with Electoral 
Marginality and for the United States we use congressional vote margins (Soroka and 
Wlezien 2010, 137-140).10 Another exception is given by Kayser and Lindstädt’s measure of 
Electoral Risk, defined as “the expected probability that the plurality party in parliament loses 
its seats plurality in the next election” (2015, 243). This measure is based on the calculation 
of loss probabilities, which depends on seats-votes elasticities and past vote swings (for 
details see Kayser and Lindstädt 2015, 245-247). Although the measure is partly time 
invariant and not strictly about potential vulnerability between elections, we add it on board 
because based on loss probabilities and so indirectly concerned with dynamics. In addition, 
though not designed specifically for studying dynamic representation, the authors themselves 
acknowledge responsiveness as one of the measure’s possible empirical applications.11  
To test the Electoral Proximity Hypothesis we rely on two measures. One possibility is 
that governments are more responsive in the election year than in previous years. Another 
possibility is that governments become more responsive the closer we get to the election time. 
Election Year is thus a dummy variable coded 1 for the election year and zero otherwise, 
whereas Electoral Proximity is a continuous variable measuring the years elapsed to election. 
All nine indicators are summarised in Table 1.  
 
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
                                                
10 Data on marginality come from Soroka and Wlezien (2010). Note that for the United States 
we re-estimated our analyses while using presidential vote margins, which mirror the findings 
based on congressional vote margins. 
11 Data on Kayser and Lindstädt’s (2015) LPR measure are available here: http://mark-
kayser.com/data.html. 
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The Model 
Since we are interested in studying how policy responds to past preferences conditional on 
electoral incentives, our dependent variable is [POLICY CHANGE (t)], which denotes the 
change in government spending between the current year and the previous year in each policy 
domain. The reason of estimating the dependent variable in changes is also methodological, 
as expenditures are considered as highly path dependent (Garrett and Mitchell 2001; Jones et 
al. 2009). Unit root tests reveal that data are non-stationary and visual inspection of 
autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation functions suggest that there is evidence of 
autocorrelation in the data. Given that in instances autocorrelation remains after first-
differencing the dependent variable, we include the lagged dependent variable [POLICY (t – 
1)] in our models (e.g., Beck and Katz 1995).12 
One of our main independent variables is [PREFS (t – 1)] which denotes preferences 
in spending in the previous year. Lagging public opinion is important to establish the time 
order (e.g., Page and Shapiro 1983). Since expenditures are quite sticky and it may take time 
to translate public preferences into policy, it is common sense to use past levels of public 
opinion to reflect preferences when budgetary policy is made (e.g., Hobolt and Klemmensen 
2008; Soroka and Wlezien 2010). This is intended to reflect the reality of policymaking in 
                                                
12 Given the concern around the use of the lagged dependent variable (LDV) whereby its 
inclusion would depress the explanatory power of main explanatory factors and absorb part of 
the trend in the dependent variable (Achen 2000; Plümper et al. 2005), we re-estimated our 
models without the [POLICY (t – 1)] variable and our substantive conclusions do not change. 
Hence, we preferred to present in the paper results from the models that control for the past 
level of spending. However, the analyses without the LDV are reported in Tables S49-S51. 
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that the cycle of budgeting largely happens over the course of the previous year (e.g., Wlezien 
and Soroka 2003).13 
For parsimonious reasons, the term [COMP (t)] that stands for “competition” 
subsumes our electoral incentives in the equations below. Whereas it is appropriate to 
estimate the Election Year and Electoral Proximity variables in the current year, it is less clear 
whether the variables measuring electoral vulnerability should be set at time (t) or at time (t – 
1). On the one hand, one could expect that what matters is the current potential vulnerability 
rather than the past government (or PM party) vulnerability. In this case, the solution adopted, 
for instance, by Hobolt and Klemmensen (2008) would be theoretically preferable. On the 
other hand, however, setting vulnerability at time (t) might be problematic to establish a 
relationship of causality between vulnerability and responsiveness. Since we appreciate that 
both current and previous levels of vulnerability may influence policy responsiveness but we 
also acknowledge the causality issue above mentioned, we decided to report the effects of 
POP, GPV, FPV, GPU and FPU for both current and previous year.14  
                                                
13 We considered the possibility that one year lag might not be enough for policy to respond. 
Thus we re-estimated our analyses with public preferences and the dynamic measures of 
electoral vulnerability variables lagged of two years. Although these analyses should be taken 
with extra caution given our already small N, we found no particular evidence of such a 
delayed (conditional) effect. The analyses are reported in Tables S70-S72. 
14 Given the way the lagged electoral vulnerability variables are created, in the empirical 
analyses we omit country-years when a new government emerged whose ideology differed 
from the previous government. This is because in these years the lagged levels of government 
vulnerability pertain to different governments. However, we consider successive governments 
with the same Prime Minister (or President) as the same and include country-years where 
there was continuity in the governing party but a new President (Prime Minister), for the 
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The main variable of interest is the interacted variable [PREFS (t – 1) × COMP (t)], 
which denotes the conditional effect of electoral incentives on policy responsiveness. If the 
Electoral Vulnerability Hypothesis is supported we should expect a significant coefficient in 
this variable (direction depends on the indicator: see Table 1). If the Electoral Proximity 
Hypothesis is supported we should expect a positive and significant coefficient in the 
interaction between public preferences and Election Year and a negative and significant 
coefficient in the interaction between public preferences and Electoral Proximity.  
Our models control for partisanship, [PARTY (t – 1)], which denotes the party of the 
Prime Minister in our two parliamentary systems. The variable is coded 1 for the Liberal 
Party in Canada and the Labour Party in the United Kingdom, and zero otherwise. In the US 
models we distinguish between the party of the president, [PARTY PRES (t – 1)], coded 1 if 
the president is Democratic, and for the average percentage of Democrats in Congress, 
[PARTY HOUSE (t – 1)]. 15  Including partisanship in the equation allows testing the 
mechanism through which public opinion influences policy and reflects party control when 
budgetary policy is made (see Hakhverdian 2010: 849-850; Soroka and Wlezien 2010).  
We estimate a series of seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) issue-specific models 
for the United Kingdom and Canada (equation 1) and the United States (equation 2):16 
                                                                                                                                                   
incoming head of government was closely associated with the outgoing leader’s government 
(see Bernardi and Adams 2017). We re-estimated our analyses (reported in Tables S67-S69) 
while including those few omitted observations and our substantive conclusions do not 
change. 
15 We use the partisanship variables available in the same data sets of the spending and 
preferences data (see footnote 6).  
16 SUR models are preferred to OLS models since our dependent variables are unlikely to be 
independent, as they are part of the same budget. We thank the anonymous reviewer for this 
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POLICY CHANGE (t)   =   b1  +  b2[POLICY (t – 1)]    
                                      +   b3[PREFS (t – 1)]    
                                      +   b4[COMP (t)] 
                                      +   b5[PREFS (t – 1) × COMP (t)]    
                                      +   b6[PARTY (t – 1)]                                                                   .    (1)  
 
POLICY CHANGE (t)   =   b1  +  b2[POLICY (t – 1)]    
                                      +   b3[PREFS (t – 1)]    
                                      +   b4[COMP (t)] 
                                      +   b5[PREFS (t – 1) × COMP (t)]    
                                      +   b6[PARTY PRES (t – 1)]                                                                
                                      +   b7[PARTY HOUSE (t – 1)]                                                   .      (2) 
 
Results 
                                                                                                                                                   
suggestion. Further, we note that, given our small N, in the paper we only report the results 
for our basic models without over controlling for any additional factors. In particular, since 
controlling for economic indicators does not subvert the validity of the main conclusions 
drawn from our basic models (these analyses are reported in Table S64-S66), we opted for a 
parsimonious strategy and decided to exclude such variables from the analyses. Also, as some 
readers might want to see the analyses for the Electoral Vulnerability Hypothesis and the 
Electoral Proximity Hypothesis controlling for the other electoral incentive, we report these 
analyses in Tables S52-S63. 
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Since our analyses produced a large number of regression tables that would hardly fit in the 
paper, we present a summary table of our results and report all analyses based on 36 
regression tables in the Online Appendix. 
Before examining the impact of electoral incentives on policy responsiveness it is 
worth mentioning whether responsiveness occurs at all. These models are reported in Tables 
S37-42 and, in line with previous studies, show that governments do respond to preferences in 
some policy domains but not in others, independently on electoral incentives. This is the case 
for defence, education, environment, health and welfare in Canada, defence, education and 
health in the UK, and defence, education, environment, health, space and welfare in the US. 
Table 2 shows the results of the country- and issue-specific analyses. The first column 
of the matrix reports the nine indicators of the electoral incentives considered by country. To 
each indicator corresponds the policy domain available for the country. Each cell reports the 
value of the sign and statistical significance (at p ≤ .01 and p ≤ .05) of the coefficient for the 
[PREFS (t – 1) × COMP (t)] interacted variable. Value “V” denotes that either Hypothesis 1 
or Hypothesis 2 is supported, meaning that the coefficient of the interacted variable is 
statistically significant in the expected direction (see Table 1). Value “X” denotes that the 
hypotheses are not supported, meaning that the interacted variable is not statistically 
significant in the expected direction at the above conventional levels. As for above, for some 
of the indicators used to test the Electoral Vulnerability Hypothesis we present these values 
for the electoral incentive term set at both time (t) and time (t – 1) separated by the vertical 
line. The last column reports the total number of policy domains in which the electoral 
incentive is statistically significant in the expected direction (again, at both (t) and (t – 1) for 
some of the indicators used to test Hypothesis 1). 
We can now examine our results. As a general overview, by looking at the last column 
in Table 2 we note that electoral incentives have a limited impact on policy responsiveness in 
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the countries included in the analysis. That is, the number of issues by country where our 
measures have a conditional effect on budgetary responsiveness to public opinion is 
considerably small. This is especially the case for our electoral proximity measures, in that the 
Electoral Proximity Hypothesis is almost always disconfirmed. However, more variation 
across countries and measures of electoral vulnerability exists, with more static indicators 
(marginality and risk) being almost always insignificant.  
The UK is where we find the lowest impact in only two domains and one measure 
(FPU).17 In Canada and the US the picture is less negative. In Canada, when electoral pressure 
is measured as GPU, the effect on policy responsiveness is found in four out of six policy 
domains (defence, education, environment and transport), and what seems to matter more is 
the current rather than the previous level of GPU. In turn, GPV and popularity have an effect 
only for transport and welfare, but timing differs. Unlike Canada, the US shows a wider 
impact of GPU across issues (five out of nine). That is, what matters most for US 
administrations is their potential electoral uncertainty rather than their extreme electoral 
vulnerability. Yet timing varies, again: in some issues the pressure is immediate, whereas in 
other issues the pressure takes longer to kick in. Instead, GPV and popularity report an effect 
only in one domain (education).18 
As for the size of the effects detected, coefficients and standard deviations reported in 
the tables reveal that they are generally small with few exceptions. Figure 1 provides a 
                                                
17 The analyses with GPU are excluded in the UK because the indicator never falls within the 
values identified for uncertainty in Table 1. We also note that in UK analyses, the partisan 
variable is omitted because all governments are from the Conservative Party. 
18 For the US we only report GPV and GPU but not FPV and FPU because both sets of 
indicators are always computed between Democrats and Republicans, and so the measures are 
identical. 
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graphical illustration of such effects, plotting predictive margins, one example per country, 
based on Table 2. 
At last, we considered the possibility that, as responsiveness can be collective and 
more pronounced when a similar set of domains is taken together (e.g., Wlezien 2004; Soroka 
and Wlezien 2010), so might be the impact of electoral incentives. We explored this 
possibility by analysing the effect of our measures on policy responsiveness in major social 
domains combined. Following Wlezien (2004), social domains include education, health and 
welfare (pensions in the UK). We use total spending and average net support in social 
domains. These analyses, again, report limited effects of electoral incentives on policy 
responsiveness (only in the UK – the case where we observed least influence of electoral 
incentives on budgetary responsiveness – we found evidence that two of our measures have a 
conditional effect on policy responsiveness in social domains combined in the expected 
direction) and are available in Tables S73-S75.19  
In sum, our analysis extends the research on the effectiveness of electoral pressures on 
policy responsiveness and suggests that electoral incentives have a limited impact on 
government responsiveness in budgetary policy, and our main conclusions are robust to 
alternative model specifications. 
 
                                                
19 Though not advisable with very small number of observations (e.g., Jennings 2013), as a 
final test, we have also re-estimated our analyses by using an error correction model (ECM) in 
order to capture some short- and long-term effects (analyses are available upon request). 
Although these analyses should be taken with extra caution, only in a handful of occasions the 
interaction between changes in public opinion and electoral incentives was statistically 
significant in the expected direction, supporting our findings of a limited impact of electoral 
incentives on policy responsiveness. 
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Sensitivity Analysis 
A final consideration that is worth addressing is in which policy domains we find our 
effects. Conventional wisdom assumes that electoral incentives enhance responsiveness. That 
is, we should theoretically expect responsiveness on issues that are important to the public to 
be more likely when electoral incentives urge. We can easily check this and the feedback part 
of the thermostatic model shows us the way: if electoral incentives have an impact (in the 
expected direction) on policy representation to public preferences on issues the public cares 
the most, then we should find evidence of public responsiveness in those issues in the first 
place. We present this test in Table 3 where we report, in the first column, the policy domains 
in which we found any effect of electoral incentives on policy responsiveness (see Table 2). 
The values Yes/No in the second and third columns denote whether the coefficient of 
reference for the policy representation (preferences at time t – 1) and public responsiveness 
(policy at time t), respectively, was statistically significant at conventional levels, along with 
the sign of the coefficient. The full analyses are reported in Tables S37-48, respectively.20  
                                                
20  Note that whether the sign of the coefficient for public preferences in the policy 
representation analyses should be positive, the sign of the coefficient for policy in the public 
responsiveness analyses can be either negative, if a negative feedback prevails, or positive, if 
a positive feedback prevails (for a full discussion on feedback, see Soroka and Wlezien 2010, 
29-30). The dependent variable in the public responsiveness model is estimated in levels (e.g., 
see Soroka and Wlezien 2005). Like in previous analyses, the analyses on public 
responsiveness control for the lagged dependent variable, which indeed appears to be strongly 
significant in all instances. Without the inclusion of the lagged dependent variable we find 
four more cases of public responsiveness (Tables S44, S46 and S48). However, this 
difference does not undermine the conclusions we can draw from Table 3. 
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From Table 3 we can draw two main conclusions. First, the second column suggests 
that, within the minority of issues per country where electoral incentives seem to have an 
effect on budgetary responsiveness to public opinion, the majority of these issues are cases of 
an enhancing effect of those incentives. Second, the third column suggests that, in the 
majority of cases where budgetary responsiveness to public opinion (conditional on electoral 
incentives) takes place, public responsiveness also takes place, and the number is even larger 
if we consider the public responsiveness analyses without controlling for the lagged 
dependent variable (see symbol † in Table 3). To conclude, if we take public responsiveness 
on a given issue as an indicator that the issue is important to the public, then these analyses 
seem suggesting that electoral incentives have a conditional effect on budgetary 
responsiveness to public opinion on those issues that are important to the public – but this 
varies across measures and issues. 
 
Conclusion and Discussion 
This paper challenged the assumption from competitive democratic theory that elections (and 
their incentives) enhance the opinion-policy link. Our paper used data on public preferences 
and spending in Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States in a variety of policy 
domains. By using nine different indicators for incentives produced by electoral competition 
(see Table 1), we found limited evidence for the expectations that government vulnerability 
and electoral proximity have an impact on policy responsiveness. Like in previous research, 
we found evidence of direct policy representation in several domains, independently of any 
electoral incentive. But contra competitive democratic theory, when the latter are interacted 
with public opinion, we found considerably limited support for the Electoral Vulnerability 
Hypothesis and even a more negative assessment for the Electoral Proximity Hypotheses. 
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Our findings extend the research on democratic responsiveness in at least three ways. 
First, applications of the thermostatic model have been more interested in disentangling the 
mechanisms between responsiveness and political institutions. By using preferences and 
spending, we contribute to this research line adding an important piece that was still 
underexplored. Second, our results contradict findings from previous research that analysed 
policy responsiveness using public priorities to measure public opinion. Unlike past work, we 
find that electoral pressures show lower impact on policy responsiveness than we previously 
thought, at least with spending. Note, however, that our sensitivity analysis seems to find 
support for an enhancing effect of electoral incentives on policy responsiveness, in that the 
effect of the latter, though generally small, is more likely for issues that are important to the 
public. Third, our paper speaks well to the comparative research that identifies factors that 
exert little impact on change in budgetary policy. While previous research focuses on 
government partisanship (Epp et al 2014; Loftis and Mortensen 2017), we contribute to this 
literature and add government vulnerability and electoral proximity to the list.   
Our results come with some limitations, since they are based on a small number of 
observations, available yearly, and limited to one policy indicator (spending). If a longer and 
more nuanced time-series would be useful, on the other hand we should not necessarily 
expect similar patterns in other policy venues. This makes intuitively sense, because 
governments might not expect to be punished in such a technical subject as budgetary policy, 
as citizens have an incentive not to invest in information (Lupia and McCubbins 1998) and 
would cue more easily off of party brands (Lau and Redlawski 2001) instead of following 
‘day-to-day policy-making activities’ (see e.g., Fortunato and Stevenson 2013). 
In addition, budgetary policy is highly incremental and only occasionally punctuated 
by large changes (e.g., Jones and Baumgartner 2005; Breunig 2006; Jones et al. 2009). 
Changing budgets (and observing the effects of this change) simply takes time. Given the 
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incremental, path-dependent nature of policy changes in Western democracies (e.g., Pierson 
2004), one might expect short-term electoral incentives to exert little impact on policy 
responsiveness and that even the latter would be subject to the ‘empirical law of public 
budgets’ observed by Jones et al. (2009). Moreover, when setting budgets, policy makers are 
often constrained by veto players (Tsebelis 1995) as well as social, economic and 
international realities largely beyond their control (Epp et al. 2014) that can change 
policymakers’ priorities (Adler and Wilkinson 2012). For instance, external factors like 
globalisation and the European integration process, or internal factors like the pressures of an 
ageing population can be timelier and may over-ride short-term electoral considerations (Mair 
2013; Lipsmeyer et al. 2017). To be clear, this all does not mean that public opinion does not 
matter for policy change. Rather our findings suggest that electoral incentives matter less for 
spending and that the public opinion effect, when existing, is more likely to be direct than 
conditional. 
However, our paper does not rule out that there might be other mechanisms in place. 
For instance, whereas we find that electoral vulnerability does not have much of an effect on 
spending (as well as on responsiveness), it may very well be the case that spending influences 
government popularity. Recent work on the costs of governing shows exactly that governing 
parties are punished when they spend more on social welfare (Bernardi and Adams 2017) and 
so the relationship between spending and popularity would be reversed.21  
Future research should develop in at least three directions. First, our analysis was 
confined only to cases of single-party government. Hence, it is hard to say whether our 
findings are robust in other contexts were coalition governments are the norm. Beyond the 
                                                
21 However, we tried whether past spending influences opinion change conditional on (current 
and past) electoral vulnerability but we did not find much evidence of elite manipulation. 
Analyses are available upon request.  
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discussion that more proportional systems and consensual democracies are better or worse for 
promoting representation and responsiveness (e.g., Lijphart 1999; Powell 2000) remains that 
we still cannot rule out the possibility that electoral incentives might matter differently for 
policy responsiveness in coalition governments when the PM party’s advantage of being the 
formateur is at risk vis-à-vis its junior coalition partners. This is still an open question, 
especially because the issue of whether coalition governments are more frictional (Hobolt and 
Klemmensen 2008; Soroka and Wlezien 2015) or more flexible (McGann and Latner 2013) is 
far from being resolved. Second, scholars should test our hypotheses in other stages of policy 
making (such as policy or legislative proposals) or in more rhetorical policy venues. 
Hakhverdian’s (2010) article on Left-Right positions and executive speeches is a good 
starting point, whereas Lax and Phillips’ (2009, 2012) policy coding approach on the US 
states is an interesting way to go. Third, our findings based on position do not necessarily 
apply to attention. For instance, Green and Jennings (2017) find that issue competence effects 
on executive and legislative agendas are moderated by public issue salience and government 
popularity. Future research should test whether electoral incentives condition the relationship 
between public and policy priorities, and Bernardi’s (2018) work goes in this direction. 
Finally, yearly time-series analysis might not be the optimal tool to capture the effects of 
electoral incentives on policy responsiveness. Hence, future research should make an effort to 
collect data at a lower level or combine more in-depth event-based approaches.  
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Figure 1. Effects of Electoral Incentives on Policy Responsiveness 
 
Notes. The figure reports an illustration of the effects of electoral incentives on policy responsiveness based on 
the statistically significant interactions between preferences and electoral incentives (Table 2). Predictive 
margins are computed from the models reported in the Online Appendix: Table S4 for Welfare (CA); Table S23 
for Defence (UK); Table S34 for Health (US). The variables are defined in the text.  
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Table 1. Operationalization of Electoral Incentives 
 
Electoral Incentives Indicator H1 / 
H2 
Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min. Max. 
Vote marginality (MARG) 
 
Percentage of votes by which a government holds a majority - 23.5 4.4 0.3 58.6 
Electoral risk (LPR) Loss probabilities depending on seats-votes elasticities and past vote 
swings 
+ 0.3 0.2 0 0.6 
Government popularity 
(POP) 
Vote intentions government - 40.5 7.1 8.9 67.2 
Government potential 
vulnerability (GPV) 
Vote intentions government – vote intentions opposition - -8.6 13.8 -51.6 34.5 
Formateur potential 
vulnerability (FPV) 
Vote intentions PM party – vote intentions major competitor - 5.8 12.6 -23.7 34.5 
Government potential 
uncertainty (GPU) 
1 = government potential vulnerability ≥ -5%, government potential 
vulnerability ≤ 5%; 0 = otherwise 
+ 0.3 0.5 0 1 
Formateur potential 
uncertainty (FPU) 
1 = formateur potential vulnerability ≥ -5%, formateur potential 
vulnerability ≤ 5%; 0 = otherwise 
+ 0.3 0.5 0 1 
Election year 
(ELECYEAR) 
1 = election year; 0 = otherwise + 0.2 0.4 0 1 
Electoral proximity 
(ELECPROX) 
Years elapsed to election - 1.6 1.2 0 4 
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Table 2. Summary of Results 
 
Canada (1988-2004) Defence Education Environment Health Transport Welfare    Total 6 
Vote margin (t-1) X X X X X X    0 
Electoral risk (t) X X X X V X    1 
Government popularity (t | t-1) X | X X | X X | X X | X V | X X | V    1 | 1 
Government potential vulnerability (t | t-1) X | X X | X X | X X | X V | X X | V    1 | 1 
Formateur potential vulnerability (t | t-1) X | X X | X X | X X | X V | X X | V    1 | 1 
Government potential uncertainty (t | t-1) V | V V | X V | X X | X X | V X | X    3 | 2 
Formateur potential uncertainty (t | t-1) X | X X | X X | X X | X X | X X | X    0 | 0 
Election year (t) X X X X V X    1 
Electoral proximity (t) X X X X V X    1 
United Kingdom (1980-1995) Defence Education Health Pensions Roads     Total 5 
Vote margin (t-1) X X X X X     0 
Electoral risk (t) X X X X X     0 
Government popularity (t | t-1) X | X X | X X | X X | X X | X     0 | 0 
Government potential vulnerability (t | t-1) X | X X | X X | X X | X X | X     0 | 0 
Formateur potential vulnerability (t | t-1) X | X X | X X | X X | X X | X     0 | 0 
Formateur potential uncertainty (t | t-1) V | X X | X X | X X | X X | V     1 | 1 
Election year (t) X X X X X     0 
Electoral proximity (t) X X X X X     0 
United States (1974-2005) Cities Crime Defence Education Environment Foreign Aid Health Space Welfare Total 9 
Vote margin (t-1) X X X V X X X X X 1 
Electoral risk (t) X X X X X X X X X 0 
Government popularity (t | t-1) X | X X | X X | X V | X X | X X | X X | X X | X X | X 1 | 0 
Government potential vulnerability (t | t-1) X | X X | X X | X V | X X | X X | X X | X X | X X | X 1 | 0 
Government potential uncertainty (t | t-1) X | X V | X X | V V | X X | V X | X V | V X | X X | X 3 | 3 
Election year (t) V X X X X X X X X  1 
Electoral proximity (t) X X V X X X X X X  1 
 
 2 
Notes. The table reports the values of the effects of the interactions between public preferences for spending and each measure of electoral incentives on spending change 
based on the seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) models reported in the Online Appendix (Tables S1-S36). “V” means that Hypothesis 1 or Hypothesis 2 is supported (** p 
≤ .01 , * p ≤ .05 , two-tailed tests.); “X” means that Hypothesis 1 or Hypothesis 2 is not supported. Dynamic measures of electoral vulnerability and uncertainty are tested at 
both time (t) and time (t – 1). The variables are defined in the text. 
 
 
Table 3. Sensitivity Analysis of Electoral Incentives Effects 
 
Effect of Electoral Incentive on Policy Responsiveness by Domain Policy Representation Public Responsiveness 
Defence (CA) Yes (+) No (-) 
Education (CA) Yes (+) No (-)† 
Environment (CA) Yes (+) No (-)† 
Transport (CA) No (+) Yes (-) 
Welfare (CA)  Yes (+) No (+) 
Defence (UK)  Yes (+)† Yes (-) 
Roads (UK) No (-) Yes (-) 
Cities (US) No (-) Yes (-) 
Crime (US) No (-) Yes (-) 
Defence (US) Yes (+) Yes (-) 
Education (US)  Yes (+) No (-)† 
Environment (US) Yes (+) Yes (-)† 
Health (US)  Yes (+) No (+)† 
Notes. For the policy domains (and countries in parentheses) in which any electoral incentives were found to have an effect in Table 2, the table reports whether the 
coefficients for public preferences at time (t – 1), in the policy representation models, and for policy at time (t), in the public responsiveness models, were statistically 
significant (Yes/No) at conventional levels (** p ≤ .01 , * p ≤ .05 , two-tailed tests.) together with their sign (+/-). The symbol † means that the coefficient was/was not 
statistically significant in the analyses without controlling for the lagged dependent variable. The full analyses are reported in the Online Appendix in Tables S37, S39 and 
S41 for policy representation and Tables S43, S45 and S47 for public responsiveness.
 0 
Online Appendix for “Policy Responsiveness and Electoral Incentives: A 
(Re)assessment” 
 
 
 
Table S1. Analyses of Vote Margin (t – 1) in Canada 
 
Canada 
 Defence Education Environment Health Transport Welfare 
POLICYt-1 -.21 
(.11) 
-.05 
(.08) 
-.26** 
(.10) 
-.03 
(.04) 
-.53* 
(.25) 
.16* 
(.18) 
PREFSt-1 .02 
(.01) 
.04 
(.12) 
.07** 
(.01) 
.25 
(.15) 
-.02 
(.03) 
-.07 
(.15) 
MARGINt-1 -.10* 
(.04) 
-.31 
(.86) 
.27 
(.07) 
.95 
(.92) 
.03 
(.08) 
.35 
(.25) 
PREFSt-1 × 
MARGINt-1 
-.00 
(.00) 
.00 
(.01) 
-.01** 
(.00) 
-.01 
(.01) 
.01 
(.01) 
.03 
(.02) 
PARTYt -1.11** 
(.30) 
-2.33** 
(.78) 
.15 
(.29) 
-1.89** 
(.72) 
-.32 
(.80) 
-6.85** 
(1.34) 
Constant 3.91** 
(1.45) 
4.65 
(8.10) 
-.99 
(.84) 
-10.76 
(9.72) 
10.00 
(5.17) 
-7.23 
(6.86) 
R2 .58 .53 .58 .66 .30 .72 
N 16 16 16 16 16 16 
 
** p ≤ .01 , * p ≤ .05 , two-tailed tests. 
Notes. The table reports the full analysis based on seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) 
models presented in Table 2. The dependent variable is POLICY CHANGE (t). For the 
definition of the independent variables, please refer to the paper. 
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Table S2. Analyses of Electoral risk (t) in Canada 
 
Canada 
 Defence Education Environment Health Transport Welfare 
POLICYt-1 -.07 
(.14) 
-.07 
(.08) 
-.24* 
(.11) 
-.05 
(.04) 
-.96** 
(.33) 
.08 
(.09) 
PREFSt-1 .08* 
(.03) 
.23 
(.18) 
.08* 
(.03) 
.24** 
(.01) 
-.51** 
(17) 
.20 
(.26) 
LPRt 2.92 
(3.54) 
44.63 
(50.33) 
4.20 
(5.09) 
38.62 
(24.92) 
-27.00** 
(9.59) 
-10.37 
(22.24) 
PREFSt-1 × 
LPRt 
-.32* 
(.16) 
-.66 
(.83) 
-.20 
(.14) 
-.66 
(.40) 
2.33** 
(.78) 
-.27 
(1.24) 
PARTYt .36 
(.58) 
-.73 
(1.51) 
.03 
(.30) 
.29 
(1.72) 
-2.71* 
(1.13) 
-7.50** 
(2.44) 
Constant 0.19 
(2.68) 
-8.88 
(12.05) 
.06 
(1.17) 
-8.54 
(5.69) 
25.86** 
(8.90) 
4.31 
(10.36) 
R2 .55 .56 .56 .69 .41 .69 
N 16 16 16 16 16 16 
 
** p ≤ .01 , * p ≤ .05 , two-tailed tests. 
Notes. The table reports the full analysis based on seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) 
models presented in Table 2. The dependent variable is POLICY CHANGE (t). For the 
definition of the independent variables, please refer to the paper. 
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Table S3. Analyses of Government Popularity (t) in Canada 
 
Canada 
 Defence Education Environment Health Transport Welfare 
POLICYt-1 -.44** 
(.11) 
-.08 
(.09) 
-.03 
(.12) 
-.05 
(.03) 
-.35 
(.24) 
.03 
(.08) 
PREFSt-1 .04 
(.04) 
-.07 
(.26) 
.00 
(.02) 
-.07 
(.07) 
.21** 
(.08) 
-.04 
(.23) 
POPt .04 
(.02) 
-.39 
(.40) 
.00 
(.04) 
-.26** 
(.10) 
.16** 
(.06) 
-.26* 
(.13) 
PREFSt-1 × 
POPt 
-.00 
(.00) 
.01 
(.01) 
.00 
(.00) 
.01** 
(.00) 
-.01* 
(.00) 
.00 
(.01) 
PARTYt -2.09** 
(.57) 
.30 
(1.71) 
-.55 
(.42) 
-.62 
(1.26) 
-2.43* 
(1.00) 
-.36 
(2.49) 
Constant 5.81** 
(1.65) 
11.75 
(13.25) 
-0.08 
(1.75) 
7.97* 
(3.51) 
3.14 
(5.11) 
7.53 
(5.16) 
R2 .58 .64 .75 .75 .46 .79 
N 16 16 16 16 16 16 
 
** p ≤ .01 , * p ≤ .05 , two-tailed tests. 
Notes. The table reports the full analysis based on seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) 
models presented in Table 2. The dependent variable is POLICY CHANGE (t). For the 
definition of the independent variables, please refer to the paper. 
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Table S4. Analyses of Government Popularity (t – 1) in Canada 
 
Canada 
 Defence Education Environment Health Transport Welfare 
POLICYt-1 -.61** 
(.13) 
-.26** 
(.06) 
-.03 
(.12) 
-.08 
(.07) 
-.71** 
(.18) 
.42** 
(.14) 
PREFSt-1 -.07 
(.04) 
-.32* 
(.16) 
-.07** 
(.03) 
-.05 
(.16) 
.08 
(.07) 
1.31** 
(.27) 
POPt-1 .08* 
(.04) 
.84** 
(.26) 
-.10** 
(.04) 
-.19 
(.19) 
.14 
(.04) 
-.68** 
(.16) 
PREFSt-1 × 
POPt-1 
.00 
(.00) 
.01** 
(.00) 
.00** 
(.00) 
.01 
(.01) 
-.00 
(.00) 
-.04** 
(.01) 
PARTYt -2.34** 
(.65) 
-.28 
(1.22) 
-.85 
(.50) 
-1.23 
(1.52) 
-3.69** 
(.88) 
-8.69* 
(3.49) 
Constant 6.75** 
(1.94) 
34.33** 
(10.00) 
3.76** 
(1.49) 
8.16 
(8.61) 
11.93** 
(3.49) 
-4.07 
(9.04) 
R2 .64 .76 .60 .54 .59 .83 
N 15 15 15 15 15 15 
 
** p ≤ .01 , * p ≤ .05 , two-tailed tests. 
Notes. The table reports the full analysis based on seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) 
models presented in Table 2. The dependent variable is POLICY CHANGE (t). For the 
definition of the independent variables, please refer to the paper. 
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Table S5. Analyses of Government Potential Vulnerability (t) in Canada 
 
Canada 
 Defence Education Environment Health Transport Welfare 
POLICYt-1 -.45** 
(.12) 
-.11 
(.07) 
-.01 
(.13) 
-.03 
(.04) 
-.48* 
(.23) 
-.05 
(.07) 
PREFSt-1 .01* 
(.01) 
.09** 
(.03) 
.03** 
(.01) 
.10** 
(.02) 
-.01 
(.02) 
.01 
(.05) 
GPVt .03 
(.01) 
-.25 
(.16) 
-.01 
(.02) 
-.11* 
(.05) 
.10** 
(.03) 
-.19** 
(.05) 
PREFSt-1 × 
GPVt 
-.00 
(.00) 
.00 
(.00) 
.00 
(.00) 
.00 
(.00) 
-.00** 
(.00) 
.00 
(.00) 
PARTYt -2.15** 
(.64) 
1.57 
(1.49) 
-.43 
(.44) 
.73 
(1.58) 
-3.07** 
(1.04) 
2.82 
(2.48) 
Constant 7.49** 
(1.87) 
-0.11 
(3.90) 
-0.54 
(0.98) 
-2.48 
(1.78) 
12.05* 
(4.93) 
0.90 
(5.09) 
R2 .55 .68 .53 .72 .53 .85 
N 16 16 16 16 16 16 
 
** p ≤ .01 , * p ≤ .05 , two-tailed tests. 
Notes. The table reports the full analysis based on seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) 
models presented in Table 2. The dependent variable is POLICY CHANGE (t). For the 
definition of the independent variables, please refer to the paper. 
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Table S6. Analyses of Government Potential Vulnerability (t – 1) in Canada 
 
Canada 
 Defence Education Environment Health Transport Welfare 
POLICYt-1 -.58** 
(.12) 
-.23** 
(.08) 
.01 
(.14) 
-.04 
(.05) 
-.76** 
(.20) 
.12 
(.10) 
PREFSt-1 .02** 
(.01) 
.18** 
(.04) 
.03** 
(.01) 
.09** 
(.03) 
-.01 
(.02) 
-.04 
(.04) 
GPVt-1 .05** 
(.02) 
-.20 
(.14) 
-.06** 
(.02) 
-.03 
(.06) 
.07** 
(.02) 
-.44** 
(.07) 
PREFSt-1 × 
GPVt-1 
.00** 
(.00) 
.00 
(.00) 
.00** 
(.00) 
-.00 
(.00) 
-.00 
(.00) 
-.02** 
(.00) 
PARTYt -2.41** 
(.63) 
.35 
(1.82) 
-.90 
(.53) 
.15 
(2.06) 
-3.46** 
(.99) 
-.26 
(3.08) 
Constant 9.44** 
(1.87) 
3.29 
(3.93) 
-0.07 
(0.93) 
-0.85 
(1.94) 
17.63** 
(4.32) 
-11.61 
(6.72) 
R2 .65 .69 .58 .54 .50 .89 
N 15 15 15 15 15 15 
 
** p ≤ .01 , * p ≤ .05 , two-tailed tests. 
Notes. The table reports the full analysis based on seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) 
models presented in Table 2. The dependent variable is POLICY CHANGE (t). For the 
definition of the independent variables, please refer to the paper. 
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Table S7. Analyses of Formateur Potential Vulnerability (t) in Canada 
 
Canada 
 Defence Education Environment Health Transport Welfare 
POLICYt-1 -.43** 
(.12) 
-.08 
(.07) 
-.07 
(.13) 
-.03 
(.04) 
-.49* 
(.23) 
-.03 
(.10) 
PREFSt-1 .02 
(.01) 
-.03 
(.09) 
.02 
(.01) 
.06 
(.03) 
.09** 
(.03) 
-.05 
(.12) 
FPVt .02 
(.02) 
-.37 
(.21) 
-.01 
(.02) 
-.13 
(.09) 
.12** 
(.05) 
-.18 
(.09) 
PREFSt-1 × 
FPVt 
-.00 
(.00) 
.00 
(.00) 
.00 
(.00) 
.00 
(.00) 
-.00** 
(.00) 
.00 
(.00) 
PARTYt -1.97* 
(.84) 
2.20 
(2.13) 
.24 
(.53) 
.45 
(2.21) 
-3.72** 
(1.40) 
1.99 
(3.98) 
Constant 6.54** 
(1.80) 
6.95 
(4.49) 
.20 
(1.24) 
0.53 
(1.92) 
9.90* 
(4.75) 
4.45 
(5.94) 
R2 .48 .63 .44 .69 .49 .74 
N 16 16 16 16 16 16 
 
** p ≤ .01 , * p ≤ .05 , two-tailed tests. 
Notes. The table reports the full analysis based on seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) 
models presented in Table 2. The dependent variable is POLICY CHANGE (t). For the 
definition of the independent variables, please refer to the paper. 
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Table S8. Analyses of Formateur Potential Vulnerability (t – 1) in Canada 
 
Canada 
 Defence Education Environment Health Transport Welfare 
POLICYt-1 -.56** 
(.11) 
-.21** 
(.07) 
-.06 
(.13) 
-.05 
(.05) 
-.72** 
(.19) 
.23* 
(.09) 
PREFSt-1 -.02 
(.01) 
.07 
(.06) 
-.00 
(.01) 
.10* 
(.04) 
.03 
(.03) 
.42** 
(.08) 
FPVt-1 .06* 
(.03) 
-.33* 
(.16) 
-.04* 
(.02) 
-.09 
(.08) 
.11** 
(.04) 
-.55** 
(.09) 
PREFSt-1 × 
FPVt-1 
.00* 
(.00) 
.00 
(.00) 
.00** 
(.00) 
-.00 
(.00) 
-.00 
(.00) 
-.02** 
(.00) 
PARTYt -2.62** 
(.85) 
.72 
(2.18) 
-.95 
(.62) 
2.24 
(2.66) 
-4.86** 
(1.38) 
.97 
(3.39) 
Constant 7.92** 
(1.67) 
8.87* 
(4.37) 
1.48 
(1.02) 
-0.50 
(2.43) 
15.49** 
(3.92) 
-8.59 
(6.04) 
R2 .61 .71 .59 .59 .54 .89 
N 15 15 15 15 15 15 
 
** p ≤ .01 , * p ≤ .05 , two-tailed tests. 
Notes. The table reports the full analysis based on seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) 
models presented in Table 2. The dependent variable is POLICY CHANGE (t). For the 
definition of the independent variables, please refer to the paper. 
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Table S9. Analyses of Government Potential Uncertainty (t) in Canada 
 
Canada 
 Defence Education Environment Health Transport Welfare 
POLICYt-1 -.54** 
(.09) 
-.09 
(.05) 
-.10 
(.11) 
-.03 
(.04) 
-.31 
(.24) 
.09 
(.06) 
PREFSt-1 -.00 
(.01) 
.05 
(.03) 
.01 
(.01) 
.10** 
(.02) 
-.01 
(.02) 
.16** 
(.06) 
GPUt -.25 
(.25) 
-7.93** 
(3.10) 
-1.28* 
(.63) 
.01 
(2.12) 
-.60 
(.79) 
-2.25 
(1.47) 
PREFSt-1 × 
GPUt 
.02** 
(.01) 
.12* 
(.05) 
.03* 
(.01) 
-.01 
(.03) 
.03 
(.03) 
-.19* 
(.09) 
PARTYt -.85** 
(.29) 
-.80 
(.76) 
.21 
(.25) 
-1.14 
(.93) 
-.30 
(.84) 
-7.38** 
(1.45) 
Constant 7.49** 
(1.25) 
4.57 
(2.98) 
.53 
(1.01) 
-.07 
(1.91) 
6.27 
(5.14) 
.66 
(4.09) 
R2 .52 .65 .49 .66 .20 .71 
N 16 16 16 16 16 16 
 
** p ≤ .01 , * p ≤ .05 , two-tailed tests. 
Notes. The table reports the full analysis based on seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) 
models presented in Table 2. The dependent variable is POLICY CHANGE (t). For the 
definition of the independent variables, please refer to the paper. 
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Table S10. Analyses of Government Potential Uncertainty (t – 1) in Canada 
 
Canada 
 Defence Education Environment Health Transport Welfare 
POLICYt-1 -.70** 
(.10) 
-.08 
(.06) 
-.12 
(.13) 
-.06 
(.04) 
-.47* 
(.19) 
.03 
(.06) 
PREFSt-1 -.00 
(.00) 
.13** 
(.04) 
.02* 
(.01) 
.10** 
(.02) 
-.04* 
(.02) 
.09 
(07) 
GPUt-1 -.43* 
(.21) 
-1.35 
(3.94) 
-.67 
(.76) 
-2.92 
(2.64) 
-2.45** 
(.65) 
-1.54 
(1.52) 
PREFSt-1 × 
GPUt-1 
.03** 
(.01) 
.02 
(.06) 
.01 
(.02) 
.02 
(.04) 
.07** 
(.02) 
-.11 
(.11) 
PARTYt -1.09** 
(.26) 
-2.34** 
(.91) 
.43 
(.27) 
-.28 
(.94) 
.29 
(.61) 
-5.67** 
(1.50) 
Constant 9.72** 
(1.30) 
0.27 
(3.27) 
0.11 
(1.19) 
1.46 
(1.81) 
9.96* 
(3.99) 
4.15 
(4.17) 
R2 .73 .60 .45 .60 .59 .68 
N 15 15 15 15 15 15 
 
** p ≤ .01 , * p ≤ .05 , two-tailed tests. 
Notes. The table reports the full analysis based on seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) 
models presented in Table 2. The dependent variable is POLICY CHANGE (t). For the 
definition of the independent variables, please refer to the paper. 
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Table S11. Analyses of Formateur Potential Uncertainty (t) in Canada 
 
Canada 
 Defence Education Environment Health Transport Welfare 
POLICYt-1 -.38** 
(.08) 
.00 
(.08) 
-.18 
(.14) 
-.02 
(.04) 
-.26 
(.24) 
.06 
(.07) 
PREFSt-1 .01** 
(.00) 
.11** 
(.03) 
.03** 
(.01) 
.10** 
(.02) 
.01 
(.01) 
.11** 
(.04) 
FPUt .15 
(.55) 
18.19 
(10.65) 
2.04 
(2.61) 
-1.70 
(4.65) 
-1.70 
(1.15) 
-3.95 
(3.17) 
PREFSt-1 × 
FPUt 
-.03 
(.04) 
-.40 
(.21) 
-.03 
(.05) 
.02 
(.12) 
.21 
(.12) 
-.01 
(.18) 
PARTYt -.77** 
(.30) 
-3.42** 
(.72) 
.72* 
(.29) 
-2.03** 
(.78) 
-.52 
(.74) 
-8.22** 
(1.40) 
Constant 5.28** 
(1.12) 
-2.66 
(3.84) 
-.06 
(1.12) 
-.42 
(1.81) 
5.25 
(5.13) 
3.83 
(5.20) 
R2 .52 .72 .51 .66 .32 .78 
N 16 16 16 16 16 16 
 
** p ≤ .01 , * p ≤ .05 , two-tailed tests. 
Notes. The table reports the full analysis based on seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) 
models presented in Table 2. The dependent variable is POLICY CHANGE (t). For the 
definition of the independent variables, please refer to the paper. 
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Table S12. Analyses of Formateur Potential Uncertainty (t – 1) in Canada 
 
Canada 
 Defence Education Environment Health Transport Welfare 
POLICYt-1 -.52** 
(.12) 
-.20** 
(.07) 
-.03 
(.17) 
-.06 
(.05) 
-.37 
(.21) 
-.32** 
(.07) 
PREFSt-1 .02** 
(.00) 
.18** 
(.03) 
.01 
(.01) 
.11** 
(.03) 
.01 
(.01) 
.07 
(.03) 
FPUt-1 -.01 
(.75) 
1.55 
(7.66) 
.91 
(1.97) 
3.80 
(11.17) 
.68 
(19.23) 
133.55 
(76.10) 
PREFSt-1 × 
FPUt-1 
-.04 
(.09) 
-.06 
(.15) 
-.01 
(.03) 
-.11 
(.24) 
-.05 
(1.61) 
16.15 
(8.68) 
PARTYt -1.26** 
(.35) 
-2.84** 
(.68) 
.24 
(.29) 
-2.16* 
(.95) 
-.29 
(.66) 
-4.98** 
(.84) 
Constant 7.27** 
(1.62) 
4.20 
(3.48) 
-.40 
(1.32) 
1.27 
(2.08) 
7.02 
(4.38) 
34.40** 
(5.42) 
R2 .49 .68 .43 .57 .40 .90 
N 15 15 15 15 15 15 
 
** p ≤ .01 , * p ≤ .05 , two-tailed tests. 
Notes. The table reports the full analysis based on seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) 
models presented in Table 2. The dependent variable is POLICY CHANGE (t). For the 
definition of the independent variables, please refer to the paper. 
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Table S13. Analyses of Election Year in Canada 
 
Canada 
 Defence Education Environment Health Transport Welfare 
POLICYt-1 -.46** 
(.09) 
-.04 
(.07) 
-.19 
(.11) 
-.01 
(.04) 
-.80** 
(.21) 
.16* 
(.07) 
PREFSt-1 .01 
(.00) 
.11** 
(.03) 
.02** 
(.01) 
.10** 
(.02) 
-.04** 
(.01) 
.14* 
(.06) 
ELECYEARt -.01 
(.24) 
-4.21 
(4.07) 
.63 
(.61) 
-.53 
(1.89) 
-2.22** 
(.56) 
-.56 
(1.61) 
PREFSt-1 ×  
ELECYEARt 
.01 
(.01) 
.06 
(.07) 
-.01 
(.01) 
-.01 
(.03) 
.08** 
(.02) 
.03 
(.11) 
PARTYt -1.07** 
(.28) 
-2.49** 
(.71) 
.42 
(.24) 
-1.80* 
(.72) 
-1.55** 
(.56) 
-8.04** 
(1.45) 
Constant 6.45** 
(1.27) 
-1.39 
(3.71) 
.55 
(.63) 
-1.47 
(1.72) 
17.25** 
(4.54) 
-4.48 
(4.73) 
R2 .46 .58 .47 .64 .43 .68 
N 16 16 16 16 16 16 
 
** p ≤ .01 , * p ≤ .05 , two-tailed tests. 
Notes. The table reports the full analysis based on seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) 
models presented in Table 2. The dependent variable is POLICY CHANGE (t). For the 
definition of the independent variables, please refer to the paper. 
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Table S14. Analyses of Electoral Proximity in Canada 
 
Canada 
 Defence Education Environment Health Transport Welfare 
POLICYt-1 -.53** 
(.11) 
.01 
(.08) 
-.29 
(.18) 
-.02 
(.04) 
-.54** 
(.15) 
.05 
(.09) 
PREFSt-1 .02** 
(.01) 
.15** 
(.05) 
.03* 
(.01) 
.11** 
(.03) 
.04** 
(.01) 
.07 
(.09) 
ELECPROXt .04 
(.09) 
2.25* 
(1.14) 
-.03 
(.27) 
.45 
(.67) 
.94** 
(.14) 
-.20 
(.72) 
PREFSt-1 ×  
ELECPROXt 
-.01 
(.00) 
-.03 
(.02) 
-.00 
(.01) 
-.01 
(.01) 
-.04** 
(.01) 
.00 
(.04) 
PARTYt -1.21** 
(.30) 
-2.32** 
(.71) 
.68* 
(.32) 
-1.72* 
(.73) 
-.81* 
(.40) 
-6.53** 
(1.54) 
Constant 7.38** 
(1.56) 
-6.97 
(4.91) 
.91 
(1.21) 
-1.43 
(2.26) 
9.63** 
(3.07) 
3.30 
(7.14) 
R2 .51 .54 .39 .64 .72 .67 
N 16 16 16 16 16 16 
 
** p ≤ .01 , * p ≤ .05 , two-tailed tests. 
Notes. The table reports the full analysis based on seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) 
models presented in Table 2. The dependent variable is POLICY CHANGE (t). For the 
definition of the independent variables, please refer to the paper. 
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Table S15. Analyses of Vote Margin (t – 1) in the UK 
 
United Kingdom 
 Defence Education Health Pensions Roads 
POLICYt-1 .72** 
(.22) 
.14 
(.12) 
.13 
(.12) 
-.32* 
(.16) 
-.29 
(.24) 
PREFSt-1 -.10 
(.07) 
-.14 
(.17) 
-.12 
(.19) 
.18 
(.13) 
.06 
(.12) 
MARGINt-1 .72* 
(.34) 
-.86 
(.91) 
-.96 
(1.01) 
.84 
(.68) 
.43 
(.66) 
PREFSt-1 × 
MARGINt-1 
.02* 
(.01) 
.01 
(.01) 
.01 
(.01) 
-.01 
(.01) 
-.01 
(.01) 
PARTYt − 
 
− − − − 
Constant -25.01* 
(6.88) 
3.98 
(8.90) 
4.65 
(9.81) 
-2.14 
(5.78) 
1.23 
(7.47) 
R2 .51 .27 .43 .13 .07 
N 15 15 15 15 15 
 
** p ≤ .01 , * p ≤ .05 , two-tailed tests. 
Notes. The table reports the full analysis based on seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) 
models presented in Table 2. The dependent variable is POLICY CHANGE (t). For the 
definition of the independent variables, please refer to the paper. 
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Table S16. Analyses of Electoral Risk (t) in the UK 
 
United Kingdom 
 Defence Education Health Pensions Roads 
POLICYt-1 .76** 
(.19) 
.03 
(.10) 
.17 
(.11) 
-.45* 
(.18) 
-.25 
(.25) 
PREFSt-1 .25** 
(.08) 
.04 
(.06) 
.08 
(.05) 
-.02 
(.04) 
-.11 
(.10) 
LPRt -12.63* 
(5.59) 
-.72 
(15.06) 
17.65 
(15.07) 
-21.23 
(17.72) 
-8.90 
(10.94) 
PREFSt-1 × LPRt -.38** 
(.15) 
-.01 
(.22) 
-.26 
(.22) 
.32 
(.18) 
.18 
(.22) 
PARTYt − − − − − 
 
Constant -14.26** 
(5.34) 
-2.54 
(5.85) 
-10.43 
(5.64) 
15.14* 
(6.62) 
8.50 
(6.39) 
R2 .48 .23 .44 .17 .01 
N 15 15 15 15 15 
 
** p ≤ .01 , * p ≤ .05 , two-tailed tests. 
Notes. The table reports the full analysis based on seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) 
models presented in Table 2. The dependent variable is POLICY CHANGE (t). For the 
definition of the independent variables, please refer to the paper. 
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Table S17. Analyses of Government Popularity (t) in the UK 
 
United Kingdom 
 Defence Education Health Pensions Roads 
POLICYt-1 .17 
(.15) 
.06 
(.08) 
.12 
(.06) 
-.41** 
(.11) 
-.21 
(.22) 
PREFSt-1 -.06 
(.08) 
.01 
(.24) 
-.16 
(.17) 
.27 
(.16) 
.19 
(.17) 
POPt .18** 
(.07) 
-.03 
(.45) 
-.32 
(.34) 
.36 
(.30) 
.29 
(.25) 
PREFSt-1 × POPt .00 
(.00) 
.00 
(.01) 
.01 
(.00) 
-.01 
(.00) 
-.01 
(.01) 
PARTYt − − − − − 
 
Constant -10.16** 
(3.89) 
-4.49 
(16.32) 
6.34 
(12.65) 
-5.61 
(10.84) 
-5.73 
(8.80) 
R2 .63 .29 .50 .12 .05 
N 15 15 15 15 15 
 
** p ≤ .01 , * p ≤ .05 , two-tailed tests. 
Notes. The table reports the full analysis based on seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) 
models presented in Table 2. The dependent variable is POLICY CHANGE (t). For the 
definition of the independent variables, please refer to the paper. 
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Table S18. Analyses of Government Popularity (t – 1) in the UK 
 
United Kingdom 
 Defence Education Health Pensions Roads 
POLICYt-1 .42** 
(.14) 
-.05 
(.08) 
-.00 
(.06) 
-.36** 
(.14) 
-.37 
(.23) 
PREFSt-1 -.36** 
(.12) 
.03 
(.28) 
.17 
(.23) 
.24 
(.22) 
.18 
(.17) 
POPt-1 .50** 
(.13) 
-.04 
(.51) 
.16 
(.45) 
.32 
(.40) 
.35 
(.25) 
PREFSt-1 × POPt-1 .01** 
(.00) 
.00 
(.01) 
-.00 
(.01) 
-.01 
(.01) 
-.01 
(.01) 
PARTYt − − − − − 
 
Constant -26.67** 
(5.35) 
.57 
(19.47) 
-10.19 
(17.24) 
-3.99 
(14.65) 
-4.50 
(8.36) 
R2 .62 .14 .36 .24 -.04 
N 14 14 14 14 14 
 
** p ≤ .01 , * p ≤ .05 , two-tailed tests. 
Notes. The table reports the full analysis based on seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) 
models presented in Table 2. The dependent variable is POLICY CHANGE (t). For the 
definition of the independent variables, please refer to the paper. 
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Table S19. Analyses of Government Potential Vulnerability (t) in the UK 
 
United Kingdom 
 Defence Education Health Pensions Roads 
POLICYt-1 .21 
(.15) 
.03 
(.08) 
.11 
(.07) 
-.47** 
(.12) 
-.22 
(.22) 
PREFSt-1 .09** 
(.03) 
.03 
(.07) 
.07 
(.06) 
.00 
(.05) 
-.13 
(.10) 
GPVt .09** 
(.04) 
.11 
(.22) 
-.09 
(.18) 
.24 
(.15) 
.16 
(.13) 
PREFSt-1 × GPVt .00 
(.00) 
-.00 
(.00) 
.00 
(.00) 
-.00 
(.00) 
-.00 
(.00) 
PARTYt − − − − − 
 
Constant -2.60 
(4.69) 
-1.81 
(5.95) 
-7.04 
(4.77) 
14.14** 
(4.94) 
9.31 
(6.05) 
R2 .62 .26 .45 .16 .01 
N 15 15 15 15 15 
 
** p ≤ .01 , * p ≤ .05 , two-tailed tests. 
Notes. The table reports the full analysis based on seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) 
models presented in Table 2. The dependent variable is POLICY CHANGE (t). For the 
definition of the independent variables, please refer to the paper. 
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Table S20. Analyses of Government Potential Vulnerability (t – 1) in the 
UK 
 
United Kingdom 
 Defence Education Health Pensions Roads 
POLICYt-1 .47** 
(.14) 
-.06 
(.08) 
.00 
(.06) 
-.32* 
(.16) 
-.36 
(.24) 
PREFSt-1 .26** 
(.06) 
.03 
(.07) 
.04 
(.06) 
.01 
(.05) 
-.15 
(.10) 
GPVt-1 .23** 
(.06) 
.05 
(.25) 
.11 
(.23) 
.10 
(.23) 
.16 
(.13) 
PREFSt-1 × GPVt-1 .01** 
(.00) 
-.00 
(.00) 
-.00 
(.00) 
-.00 
(.00) 
-.00 
(.00) 
PARTYt − − − − − 
 
Constant -4.37 
(4.40) 
.44 
(5.98) 
-2.15 
(5.36) 
9.12 
(6.84) 
11.78 
(6.59) 
R2 .59 .15 .35 .24 -.04 
N 14 14 14 14 14 
 
** p ≤ .01 , * p ≤ .05 , two-tailed tests. 
Notes. The table reports the full analysis based on seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) 
models presented in Table 2. The dependent variable is POLICY CHANGE (t). For the 
definition of the independent variables, please refer to the paper. 
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Table S21. Analyses of Formateur Potential Vulnerability (t) in the UK 
 
United Kingdom 
 Defence Education Health Pensions Roads 
POLICYt-1 -.02 
(.18) 
.16 
(.09) 
.12 
(.07) 
-.31* 
(.13) 
-.18 
(.21) 
PREFSt-1 .03 
(.01) 
.09** 
(.03) 
.05 
(.03) 
.04 
(.03) 
.02 
(.06) 
FPVt .09** 
(.03) 
-.45* 
(.26) 
-.26 
(.21) 
.08 
(.20) 
.05 
(.11) 
PREFSt-1 × FPVt .00 
(.00) 
.01* 
(.00) 
.00 
(.00) 
-.00 
(.00) 
-.00 
(.00) 
PARTYt − − − − − 
 
Constant 1.55 
(4.99) 
-10.73** 
(2.94) 
-6.67** 
(2.24) 
6.64* 
(2.98) 
1.46 
(4.26) 
R2 .65 .55 .49 .07 .22 
N 15 15 15 15 15 
 
** p ≤ .01 , * p ≤ .05 , two-tailed tests. 
Notes. The table reports the full analysis based on seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) 
models presented in Table 2. The dependent variable is POLICY CHANGE (t). For the 
definition of the independent variables, please refer to the paper. 
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Table S22. Analyses of Formateur Potential Vulnerability (t – 1) in the UK 
 
United Kingdom 
 Defence Education Health Pensions Roads 
POLICYt-1 .13 
(.16) 
-.00 
(.08) 
-.04 
(.06) 
-.35 
(.10) 
-.23 
(.21) 
PREFSt-1 .09** 
(.02) 
.05 
(.04) 
.06 
(.04) 
.02 
(.03) 
-.04 
(.05) 
FPVt-1 .24** 
(.06) 
-.36 
(.28) 
.16 
(.28) 
.24 
(.19) 
.17 
(.12) 
PREFSt-1 × FPVt-1 .01** 
(.00) 
.01 
(.00) 
-.00 
(.00) 
-.00 
(.00) 
-.00 
(.00) 
PARTYt − − − − − 
 
Constant -.76 
(4.64) 
-2.72 
(3.58) 
-2.51 
(2.73) 
9.49** 
(2.67) 
4.85 
(4.32) 
R2 .68 .20 .38 .34 .17 
N 14 14 14 14 14 
 
** p ≤ .01 , * p ≤ .05 , two-tailed tests. 
Notes. The table reports the full analysis based on seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) 
models presented in Table 2. The dependent variable is POLICY CHANGE (t). For the 
definition of the independent variables, please refer to the paper. 
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Table S23. Analyses of Formateur Potential Uncertainty (t) in the UK 
 
United Kingdom 
 Defence Education Health Pensions Roads 
POLICYt-1 .52** 
(.16) 
.07 
(.08) 
.04 
(.06) 
-.05 
(.11) 
-.17 
(.20) 
PREFSt-1 .06** 
(.01) 
.01 
(.05) 
.03 
(.04) 
-.01 
(.04) 
-.01 
(.04) 
FPUt 10.13** 
(3.40) 
-6.29 
(4.00) 
-5.96 
(4.19) 
-4.36 
(3.08) 
6.90 
(4.24) 
PREFSt-1 × FPUt .26** 
(.09) 
.10 
(.06) 
.08 
(.05) 
.06 
(.04) 
-.14 
(.09) 
PARTYt − − − − − 
 
Constant -14.06** 
(4.34) 
-2.53 
(2.48) 
-3.17 
(2.22) 
2.85 
(2.16) 
2.30 
(3.67) 
R2 .57 .43 .46 .26 .11 
N 15 15 15 15 15 
 
** p ≤ .01 , * p ≤ .05 , two-tailed tests. 
Notes. The table reports the full analysis based on seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) 
models presented in Table 2. The dependent variable is POLICY CHANGE (t). For the 
definition of the independent variables, please refer to the paper. 
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Table S24. Analyses of Formateur Potential Uncertainty (t – 1) in the UK 
 
United Kingdom 
 Defence Education Health Pensions Roads 
POLICYt-1 .67** 
(.16) 
-.04 
(.08) 
-.01 
(.05) 
-.20 
(.11) 
.03 
(.22) 
PREFSt-1 .05** 
(.02) 
.05 
(.05) 
.07* 
(.04) 
.05 
(.03) 
-.02 
(.03) 
FPUt-1 -.56 
(1.80) 
9.77 
(6.56) 
-7.04 
(6.06) 
5.51 
(3.60) 
-10.18** 
(3.33) 
PREFSt-1 × FPUt-1 .01 
(.05) 
-.13 
(.09) 
.08 
(.08) 
-.07 
(.05) 
.22** 
(.07) 
PARTYt − − − − − 
 
Constant -18.12** 
(4.46) 
-1.68 
(2.92) 
-3.91 
(2.44) 
2.67 
(2.80) 
.49 
(3.73) 
R2 .41 .19 .37 .10 .21 
N 14 14 14 14 14 
 
** p ≤ .01 , * p ≤ .05 , two-tailed tests. 
Notes. The table reports the full analysis based on seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) 
models presented in Table 2. The dependent variable is POLICY CHANGE (t). For the 
definition of the independent variables, please refer to the paper. 
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Table S25. Analyses of Election Year in the UK 
 
United Kingdom 
 Defence Education Health Pensions Roads 
POLICYt-1 .51** 
(.17) 
-.04 
(.07) 
.02 
(.05) 
-.14 
(.11) 
-.41* 
(.20) 
PREFSt-1 .06** 
(.02) 
.07* 
(.03) 
.06 
(.03) 
.02 
(.03) 
-.05 
(.04) 
ELECYEARt .44 
(4.31) 
-6.18 
(6.90) 
-5.32 
(4.59) 
1.00 
(4.36) 
8.63 
(5.85) 
PREFSt-1 ×  
ELECYEARt 
-.00 
(.11) 
.10 
(.10) 
.08 
(.06) 
-.01 
(.06) 
-.16 
(.12) 
PARTYt − − − − − 
 
Constant -13.82 
(4.74) 
-3.35 
(2.31) 
-4.32* 
(1.99) 
3.55 
(2.51) 
6.71 
(3.66) 
R2 .38 .37 .49 .11 .10 
N 15 15 15 15 15 
 
** p ≤ .01 , * p ≤ .05 , two-tailed tests. 
Notes. The table reports the full analysis based on seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) 
models presented in Table 2. The dependent variable is POLICY CHANGE (t). For the 
definition of the independent variables, please refer to the paper. 
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Table S26. Analyses of Electoral Proximity in the UK 
 
United Kingdom 
 Defence Education Health Pensions Roads 
POLICYt-1 .43* 
(.18) 
-.00 
(.09) 
.06 
(.05) 
-.12 
(.11) 
-.36 
(.22) 
PREFSt-1 .06* 
(.03) 
.14* 
(.06) 
.11** 
(.04) 
.02 
(.04) 
.01 
(.07) 
ELECPROXt -.34 
(.59) 
2.45 
(2.27) 
1.93 
(1.54) 
-.30 
(1.38) 
1.05 
(1.38) 
PREFSt-1 ×  
ELECPROXt 
-.01 
(.02) 
-.04 
(.03) 
-.03 
(.02) 
.00 
(.02) 
-.03 
(.03) 
PARTYt − − − − − 
 
Constant -10.89* 
(5.52) 
-8.98 
(4.79) 
-9.02** 
(3.13) 
2.91 
(3.34) 
4.01 
(4.24) 
R2 .40 .30 .56 .23 .10 
N 15 15 15 15 15 
 
** p ≤ .01 , * p ≤ .05 , two-tailed tests. 
Notes. The table reports the full analysis based on seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) 
models presented in Table 2. The dependent variable is POLICY CHANGE (t). For the 
definition of the independent variables, please refer to the paper. 
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Table S27. Analyses of Vote Margin for Congressional Party (t – 1) in the 
US 
 
United States 
 Cities Crime Defence Education Environment Foreign 
Aid 
Health Space Welfare 
POLICYt-1 -.29** 
(.10) 
-.25** 
(.08) 
.02 
(.04) 
-.30* 
(.13) 
-.23** 
(.07) 
-.51** 
(.12) 
.00 
(.03) 
-.14** 
(.04) 
.05 
(.04) 
PREFSt-1 .76 
(.49) 
-5.71** 
(1.53) 
6.71* 
(3.29) 
5.42** 
(1.63) 
.94 
(.60) 
1.72 
(1.15) 
-.18 
(1.91) 
.16 
(.14) 
-2.57* 
(1.20) 
MARGt-1 .61 
(.35) 
7.13** 
(1.92) 
1.32 
(1.47) 
4.61** 
(1.73) 
.84 
(.58) 
-2.37 
(1.57) 
-.57 
(2.03) 
-.16 
(.11) 
.87 
(1.09) 
PREFSt-1 × 
MARGt-1 
-.01 
(.01) 
.11** 
(.03) 
-.11 
(.06) 
-.09** 
(.03) 
-.02 
(.01) 
-.03 
(.02) 
.02 
(.03) 
-.00 
(.00) 
.06* 
(.02) 
PARTY 
PRESt 
.44 
(.56) 
.73 
(.78) 
-5.62 
(5.58) 
-3.34 
(2.01) 
.73 
(.48) 
-1.89* 
(.95) 
1.45 
(1.57) 
-.29 
(.21) 
2.98 
(2.98) 
PARTY 
HOUSEt 
.10 
(.08) 
-.01 
(.14) 
-1.97** 
(.77) 
.48 
(.36) 
.03 
(.08) 
.07 
(.16) 
-.17 
(.25) 
.07 
(.04) 
1.16** 
(.42) 
Constant -34.17* 
(17.38) 
381.81 
(99.87) 
44.84 
(52.64) 
-282.16** 
(90.56) 
-45.14 
(30.24) 
128.76 
(77.74) 
5.20 
(107.45) 
8.73 
(5.08) 
-99.31 
(53.60) 
R2 .34 .15 .65 .21 .33 .27 .60 .36 .19 
N 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 
 
** p ≤ .01 , * p ≤ .05 , two-tailed tests. 
Notes. The table reports the full analysis based on seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) 
models presented in Table 2. The dependent variable is POLICY CHANGE (t). For the 
definition of the independent variables, please refer to the paper. 
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Table S28. Analyses of Electoral Risk (t) in the US 
 
United States 
 Cities Crime Defence Education Environment Foreign 
Aid 
Health Space Welfare 
POLICYt-1 -.31* 
(.12) 
-.16* 
(.08) 
.01 
(.04) 
-.15 
(.12) 
-.35** 
(.08) 
-.47** 
(.14) 
-.06 
(.03) 
-.10* 
(.04) 
-.08 
(.06) 
PREFSt-1 -.08 
(.05) 
-.11 
(.15) 
.90** 
(.25) 
.14 
(.15) 
-.00 
(.04) 
.06 
(.17) 
.55** 
(.15) 
.07** 
(.01) 
.40** 
(.15) 
LPRt -6.95 
(5.93) 
4.55 
(27.92) 
19.39 
(23.15) 
-29.81 
(46.32) 
-5.85 
(10.40) 
4.59 
(24.73) 
2.66 
(32.93) 
-3.72 
(2.51) 
36.49 
(22.17) 
PREFSt-1 × 
LPRt 
.18 
(.17) 
.09 
(.41) 
-.74 
(.88) 
.68 
(.69) 
.24 
(.19) 
.04 
(.37) 
.41 
(.57) 
-.11 
(.08) 
-.44 
(.38) 
PARTY 
PRESt 
.69 
(.98) 
-1.82 
(1.32) 
-22.56** 
(7.58) 
-3.41 
(3.59) 
-.46 
(.69) 
-2.32 
(1.41) 
-4.21 
(2.53) 
-.34 
(.35) 
-6.16 
(4.37) 
PARTY 
HOUSEt 
.14* 
(.07) 
.02 
(.13) 
-.54 
(.65) 
.43 
(.30) 
.20** 
(.07) 
.05 
(.14) 
.37 
(.21) 
.02 
(.03) 
1.20** 
(.32) 
Constant -2.09 
(4.90) 
6.85 
(13.69) 
40.68 
(40.62) 
-25.65 
(18.51) 
-4.32 
(4.13) 
8.61 
(14.13) 
-49.00** 
(13.86) 
2.55 
(1.97) 
-51.32** 
(18.74) 
R2 .29 .14 .67 .16 .36 .24 .65 .40 .36 
N 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 
 
** p ≤ .01 , * p ≤ .05 , two-tailed tests. 
Notes. The table reports the full analysis based on seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) 
models presented in Table 2. The dependent variable is POLICY CHANGE (t). For the 
definition of the independent variables, please refer to the paper. 
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Table S29. Analyses of Government Popularity (t) in the US 
 
United States 
 Cities Crime Defence Education Environment Foreign 
Aid 
Health Space Welfare 
POLICYt-1 -.44** 
(.10) 
-.24** 
(.08) 
.09 
(.06) 
-.36** 
(.12) 
.06 
(.09) 
-.50** 
(.13) 
-.03 
(.03) 
-.13** 
(.05) 
.04 
(.06) 
PREFSt-1 .24 
(.22) 
-1.87 
(.97) 
1.12 
(1.38) 
4.22** 
(1.00) 
.05 
(.29) 
.94 
(.61) 
.88 
(1.36) 
.11 
(.10) 
-.59 
(.76) 
POPt .36* 
(.14) 
-2.24 
(1.18) 
.71 
(.77) 
2.88** 
(.84) 
.09 
(.27) 
-1.35 
(.85) 
-.02 
(1.37) 
-.05 
(.07) 
.40 
(.65) 
PREFSt-1 × 
POPt 
-.01 
(.00) 
.03 
(.02) 
-.01 
(.03) 
-.08** 
(.02) 
.00 
(.01) 
-.02 
(.01) 
-.00 
(.02) 
-.00 
(.00) 
.02 
(.01) 
PARTY 
PRESt 
1.38** 
(.51) 
.11 
(.79) 
-8.05 
(6.48) 
-6.34** 
(2.27) 
1.24** 
(.45) 
-2.14* 
(.95) 
.66 
(1.62) 
-.24 
(.24) 
1.99 
(3.22) 
PARTY 
HOUSEt 
.06 
(.04) 
-.00 
(.10) 
-1.46** 
(.55) 
.49** 
(.19) 
-.03 
(.05) 
.10 
(.11) 
.02 
(.17) 
.03 
(.02) 
.67* 
(.28) 
Constant -16.91* 
(7.84) 
135.11* 
(62.02) 
27.39 
(45.78) 
-165.87** 
(50.75) 
-7.69 
(13.99) 
75.41 
(41.57) 
-31.68 
(74.82) 
4.60 
(3.67) 
-50.10 
(44.55) 
R2 .47 .10 .62 .42 .43 .29 .59 .36 .21 
N 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 
 
** p ≤ .01 , * p ≤ .05 , two-tailed tests. 
Notes. The table reports the full analysis based on seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) 
models presented in Table 2. The dependent variable is POLICY CHANGE (t). For the 
definition of the independent variables, please refer to the paper. 
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Table S30. Analyses of Government Popularity (t – 1) in the US 
 
United States 
 Cities Crime Defence Education Environment Foreign 
Aid 
Health Space Welfare 
POLICYt-1 -.46** 
(.08) 
-.17* 
(.08) 
.08 
(.07) 
.00 
(.14) 
-.05 
(.07) 
-.52** 
(.13) 
-.06* 
(.02) 
-.10 
(.06) 
.01 
(.06) 
PREFSt-1 .13 
(.18) 
-.47 
(1.22) 
2.06 
(1.98) 
2.02 
(1.34) 
.15 
(.34) 
.49 
(.69) 
2.44* 
(1.06) 
.03 
(.13) 
-.41 
(.83) 
POPt-1 .29* 
(.13) 
-.53 
(1.48) 
.67 
(.95) 
2.17 
(1.14) 
.26 
(.32) 
-.64 
(.96) 
1.38 
(1.10) 
-.00 
(.09) 
.27 
(.66) 
PREFSt-1 × 
POPt-1 
-.00 
(.00) 
.01 
(.02) 
-.02 
(.04) 
-.03 
(.02) 
-.00 
(.01) 
-.01 
(.01) 
-.03 
(.02) 
.00 
(.00) 
.01 
(.01) 
PARTY 
PRESt 
1.18** 
(.43) 
.12 
(.87) 
-9.96 
(8.64) 
1.64 
(2.62) 
1.72** 
(.43) 
-2.54* 
(1.10) 
1.94 
(1.55) 
-.25 
(.27) 
3.10 
(3.53) 
PARTY 
HOUSEt 
.02 
(.04) 
-.03 
(.13) 
-1.65* 
(.73) 
.03 
(.29) 
-.10 
(.06) 
.03 
(.15) 
.17 
(.18) 
.03 
(.03) 
.62 
(.34) 
Constant -12.15 
(6.24) 
44.11 
(77.55) 
43.25 
(50.97) 
-156.59* 
(70.31) 
-15.80 
(16.53) 
44.94 
(46.45) 
-121.20* 
(60.24) 
1.06 
(4.70) 
-38.31 
(43.50) 
R2 .55 .13 .58 .23 .55 .27 .63 .33 .15 
N 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 
 
** p ≤ .01 , * p ≤ .05 , two-tailed tests. 
Notes. The table reports the full analysis based on seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) 
models presented in Table 2. The dependent variable is POLICY CHANGE (t). For the 
definition of the independent variables, please refer to the paper. 
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Table S31. Analyses of Government (and Formateur) Potential 
Vulnerability (t) in the US 
 
United States 
 Cities Crime Defence Education Environment Foreign 
Aid 
Health Space Welfare 
POLICYt-1 -.44** 
(.10) 
-.25** 
(.08) 
.09 
(.06) 
-.36** 
(.12) 
-.06 
(.09) 
-.50** 
(.13) 
-.03 
(.03) 
-.13** 
(.05) 
.04 
(.06) 
PREFSt-1 -.04 
(.04) 
-.28** 
(.10) 
.77** 
(.16) 
.30 
(.19) 
.09** 
(.04) 
.07 
(.08) 
.68** 
(.20) 
.06** 
(.02) 
.20 
(.15) 
GPVt .18 
(.07) 
-1.12 
(.59) 
.36 
(.39) 
1.44** 
(.42) 
.05 
(.13) 
-.68 
(.43) 
-.01 
(.68) 
-.03 
(.04) 
.20 
(.33) 
PREFSt-1 × 
GPVt 
-.00 
(.00) 
.02 
(.01) 
-.00 
(.01) 
-.04** 
(.01) 
.00 
(.00) 
-.01 
(.01) 
-.00 
(.01) 
-.00 
(.00) 
.01 
(.01) 
PARTY 
PRESt 
1.38** 
(.51) 
.11 
(.79) 
-8.05 
(6.48) 
-6.34** 
(2.27) 
1.24** 
(.45) 
-2.14* 
(.95) 
.66 
(1.62) 
-.24 
(.24) 
1.99 
(3.22) 
PARTY 
HOUSEt 
.06 
(.04) 
-.00 
(.10) 
-1.46** 
(.55) 
.49** 
(.19) 
-.03 
(.05) 
.10 
(.11) 
.02 
(.17) 
.03 
(.02) 
.67* 
(.28) 
Constant .96 
(2.70) 
23.26** 
(7.31) 
63.12* 
(29.06) 
-21.83 
(16.39) 
-3.09 
(3.19) 
7.87 
(6.14) 
-32.73** 
(11.74) 
2.05 
(1.33) 
-30.25 
(19.14) 
R2 .47 .10 .62 .42 .43 .29 .60 .36 .21 
N 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 
 
** p ≤ .01 , * p ≤ .05 , two-tailed tests. 
Notes. The table reports the full analysis based on seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) 
models presented in Table 2. The dependent variable is POLICY CHANGE (t). For the 
definition of the independent variables, please refer to the paper. 
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Table S32. Analyses of Government (and Formateur) Potential 
Vulnerability (t – 1) in the US 
 
United States 
 Cities Crime Defence Education Environment Foreign 
Aid 
Health Space Welfare 
POLICYt-1 -.46** 
(.08) 
-.17* 
(.08) 
.08 
(.07) 
.00 
(.14) 
-.05 
(.07) 
-.52** 
(.13) 
-.06* 
(.02) 
-.09 
(.06) 
.01 
(.06) 
PREFSt-1 -.01 
(.03) 
-.19 
(.12) 
.94** 
(.23) 
.73** 
(.24) 
.14** 
(.04) 
.08 
(.09) 
.90** 
(.17) 
.04 
(.03) 
.22 
(.16) 
GPVt-1 .15* 
(.06) 
-.27 
(.74) 
.33 
(.47) 
1.09 
(.57) 
.13 
(.16) 
-.32 
(.48) 
.69 
(.55) 
-.00 
(.05) 
.14 
(.33) 
PREFSt-1 × 
GPVt-1 
-.00 
(.00) 
.00 
(.01) 
-.01 
(.02) 
-.01 
(.01) 
-.00 
(.00) 
-.00 
(.01) 
-.02 
(.01) 
.00 
(.00) 
.01 
(.01) 
PARTY 
PRESt 
1.18** 
(.43) 
.12 
(.87) 
-9.96 
(8.64) 
1.64 
(2.62) 
1.72** 
(.43) 
-2.54* 
(1.10) 
1.94 
(1.55) 
-.25 
(.27) 
3.10 
(3.53) 
PARTY 
HOUSEt 
.02 
(.04) 
-.03 
(.13) 
-1.65* 
(.73) 
.03 
(.29) 
-.10 
(.06) 
.03 
(.15) 
.17 
(.18) 
.03 
(.03) 
.62 
(.34) 
Constant 2.50 
(2.36) 
17.61* 
(8.24) 
76.60* 
(38.56) 
-48.04* 
(19.75) 
-2.96 
(2.96) 
12.97 
(7.94) 
-51.95** 
(11.67) 
1.05 
(1.76) 
-24.80 
(20.77) 
R2 .55 .13 .58 .23 .55 .27 .63 .33 .15 
N 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 
 
** p ≤ .01 , * p ≤ .05 , two-tailed tests. 
Notes. The table reports the full analysis based on seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) 
models presented in Table 2. The dependent variable is POLICY CHANGE (t). For the 
definition of the independent variables, please refer to the paper. 
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Table S33. Analyses of Government (and Formateur) Potential Uncertainty 
(t) in the US 
 
United States 
 Cities Crime Defence Education Environment Foreign 
Aid 
Health Space Welfare 
POLICYt-1 -.30** 
(.10) 
-.14* 
(.06) 
.05 
(.04) 
-.05 
(.09) 
-.20** 
(.07) 
-.61** 
(.13) 
.01 
(.02) 
-.06 
(.04) 
.02 
(.04) 
PREFSt-1 -.01 
(.03) 
-.23** 
(.08) 
.67** 
(.11) 
.21 
(.11) 
.05* 
(.02) 
.22* 
(.10) 
.36** 
(.10) 
.05** 
(.01) 
.34* 
(.13) 
GPUt 6.67* 
(2.87) 
-18.72** 
(6.52) 
7.96 
(6.46) 
-169.68** 
(48.11) 
-4.87 
(6.66) 
-11.11 
(9.26) 
-20.76 
(12.08) 
-1.46 
(1.13) 
-1.01 
(6.51) 
PREFSt-1 × 
GPUt 
-.17* 
(.07) 
.33** 
(.11) 
.51 
(.33) 
2.62** 
(.73) 
.11 
(.12) 
-.15 
(.14) 
.37* 
(.18) 
-.04 
(.03) 
-.16 
(.19) 
PARTY 
PRESt 
1.29* 
(.56) 
-.49 
(.83) 
-11.80* 
(5.51) 
-.53 
(2.01) 
.40 
(.52) 
-1.84 
(.98) 
-1.08 
(1.53) 
-.23 
(.22) 
1.58 
(3.31) 
PARTY 
HOUSEt 
.18** 
(.04) 
-.19* 
(.08) 
-.77 
(.43) 
.29 
(.18) 
.08* 
(.04) 
.00 
(.09) 
.07 
(.13) 
.01 
(.02) 
.61* 
(.26) 
Constant -6.72** 
(2.62) 
27.42** 
(7.94) 
41.64 
(31.81) 
-24.83 
(14.02) 
-2.91 
(3.41) 
24.61** 
(7.92) 
-21.41* 
(8.72) 
2.01 
(1.29) 
-22.28 
(16.89) 
R2 .33 .04 .65 .28 .36 .25 .66 .42 .24 
N 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 
 
** p ≤ .01 , * p ≤ .05 , two-tailed tests. 
Notes. The table reports the full analysis based on seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) 
models presented in Table 2. The dependent variable is POLICY CHANGE (t). For the 
definition of the independent variables, please refer to the paper. 
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Table S34. Analyses of Government (and Formateur) Potential Uncertainty 
(t – 1) in the US 
 
United States 
 Cities Crime Defence Education Environment Foreign 
Aid 
Health Space Welfare 
POLICYt-1 -.21** 
(.07) 
-.13* 
(.06) 
-.01 
(.04) 
-.10 
(.09) 
-.27** 
(.06) 
-.53** 
(.14) 
-.03 
(.01) 
-.09* 
(.04) 
.03 
(.05) 
PREFSt-1 .02 
(.02) 
.00 
(.10) 
.59** 
(.13) 
.30** 
(.10) 
.05* 
(.02) 
.17 
(.12) 
.61** 
(.09) 
.06** 
(.01) 
.41** 
(.15) 
GPUt-1 1.12 
(2.06) 
15.69* 
(7.62) 
5.87 
(7.13) 
-122.88 
(75.44) 
-21.49* 
(9.72) 
-3.47 
(11.06) 
-31.77* 
(12.66) 
-1.15 
(1.37) 
-8.78 
(7.45) 
PREFSt-1 × 
GPUt-1 
-.01 
(.05) 
-.20 
(.13) 
1.05* 
(.49) 
1.87 
(1.13) 
.44* 
(.18) 
-.04 
(.17) 
.57** 
(.19) 
-.05 
(.04) 
-.27 
(.21) 
PARTY 
PRESt 
.17 
(.51) 
-.49 
(.83) 
-11.25 
(7.46) 
.85 
(2.37) 
.43 
(.45) 
-2.27 
(1.20) 
1.62 
(1.53) 
-.45 
(.28) 
4.48 
(3.69) 
PARTY 
HOUSEt 
.13** 
(.04) 
-.02 
(.08) 
-1.23* 
(.52) 
.27 
(.22) 
.15** 
(.04) 
-.03 
(.11) 
.15 
(.13) 
.04 
(.03) 
.60 
(.31) 
Constant -6.38** 
(2.13) 
3.11 
(8.72) 
86.62* 
(36.96) 
-26.43 
(15.61) 
-5.13 
(2.86) 
21.98* 
(9.48) 
-38.83** 
(8.65) 
1.03 
(1.59) 
-20.63 
(19.11) 
R2 .42 .40 .62 .17 .60 .25 .71 .35 .16 
N 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 
 
** p ≤ .01 , * p ≤ .05 , two-tailed tests. 
Notes. The table reports the full analysis based on seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) 
models presented in Table 2. The dependent variable is POLICY CHANGE (t). For the 
definition of the independent variables, please refer to the paper. 
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Table S35. Analyses of Election Year in the US 
 
United States 
 Cities Crime Defence Education Environment Foreign 
Aid 
Health Space Welfare 
POLICYt-1 -.32** 
(.09) 
-.09 
(.05) 
.04 
(.04) 
.02 
(.10) 
-.16** 
(.06) 
-.42** 
(.13) 
-.01 
(.02) 
-.07* 
(.03) 
.05 
(.04) 
PREFSt-1 -.07* 
(.04) 
-.02 
(.06) 
.71** 
(.11) 
.26* 
(.11) 
.07** 
(.02) 
.06 
(.08) 
.59** 
(.11) 
.06** 
(.01) 
.37** 
(.13) 
ELECYEARt -4.14* 
(1.67) 
20.40** 
(5.93) 
3.61 
(4.92) 
8.94 
(10.52) 
2.59 
(2.30) 
9.20 
(8.44) 
-4.06 
(9.30) 
-.74 
(.54) 
-9.17 
(6.10) 
PREFSt-1 × 
ELECYEARt 
.12** 
(.05) 
-.31** 
(.10) 
-.01 
(.23) 
-.22 
(.18) 
-.04 
(.04) 
.15 
(.13) 
.09 
(.15) 
-.03* 
(.02) 
-.31 
(.20) 
PARTY 
PRESt 
.89* 
(.45) 
.26 
(.62) 
-13.70** 
(4.67) 
-.93 
(1.75) 
.73 
(.47) 
-1.88* 
(.91) 
1.04 
(1.48) 
-.24 
(.20) 
2.41 
(2.99) 
PARTY 
HOUSEt 
.16** 
(.04) 
-.14* 
(.06) 
-1.08** 
(.37) 
.18 
(.19) 
.05 
(.04) 
.02 
(.09) 
-.07 
(.14) 
.03 
(.02) 
.72** 
(.27) 
Constant -3.36 
(2.32) 
10.81 
(5.81) 
63.07* 
(27.74) 
-23.02 
(14.76) 
-3.14 
(3.31) 
10.48 
(5.70) 
-25.90** 
(9.81) 
1.51 
(1.13) 
-29.55 
(16.76) 
R2 .27 .35 .63 .23 .30 .23 .60 .43 .26 
N 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 
 
** p ≤ .01 , * p ≤ .05 , two-tailed tests. 
Notes. The table reports the full analysis based on seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) 
models presented in Table 2. The dependent variable is POLICY CHANGE (t). For the 
definition of the independent variables, please refer to the paper. 
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Table S36. Analyses of Electoral Proximity in the US 
 
United States 
 Cities Crime Defence Education Environment Foreign 
Aid 
Health Space Welfare 
POLICYt-1 -.26** 
(.09) 
-.06 
(.05) 
.03 
(.04) 
-.05 
(.10) 
-.16** 
(.06) 
-.43** 
(.13) 
.00 
(.02) 
-.08** 
(.03) 
.05 
(.04) 
PREFSt-1 -.00 
(.04) 
-.26** 
(.07) 
1.08** 
(.17) 
.22 
(.16) 
.03 
(.03) 
.17 
(.10) 
.76** 
(.15) 
.04** 
(.01) 
.14 
(.17) 
ELECPROXt .77 
(.66) 
-9.27** 
(2.21) 
-2.21 
(1.77) 
-1.64 
(4.42) 
-1.41 
(.91) 
-2.09 
(3.15) 
5.30 
(3.50) 
.20 
(.19) 
2.93 
(2.23) 
PREFSt-1 × 
ELECPROXt 
-.02 
(.02) 
.14** 
(.04) 
-.18* 
(.07) 
.04 
(.07) 
.02 
(.02) 
-.03 
(.05) 
-.10 
(.06) 
.01 
(.01) 
.09 
(.07) 
PARTY 
PRESt 
.78 
(.45) 
.23 
(.62) 
-14.53** 
(4.41) 
-.86 
(1.86) 
.76 
(.46) 
-1.90* 
(.91) 
.97 
(1.39) 
-.25 
(.20) 
2.08 
(3.07) 
PARTY 
HOUSEt 
.14** 
(.04) 
-.13* 
(.06) 
-1.08** 
(.35) 
.21 
(.20) 
.05 
(.04) 
.03 
(.09) 
-.01 
(.13) 
.03 
(.02) 
.69** 
(.26) 
Constant -5.40* 
(2.40) 
25.82** 
(6.29) 
71.11** 
(26.25) 
-21.15 
(16.83) 
-.59 
(3.52) 
17.09* 
(6.89) 
-39.20** 
(10.72) 
1.30 
(1.20) 
-34.65* 
(17.39) 
R2 .32 .38 .68 .13 .31 .23 .67 .39 .23 
N 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 
 
** p ≤ .01 , * p ≤ .05 , two-tailed tests. 
Notes. The table reports the full analysis based on seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) 
models presented in Table 2. The dependent variable is POLICY CHANGE (t). For the 
definition of the independent variables, please refer to the paper. 
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Table S37. SUR Models of Policy Representation in Canada 
 
Canada 
 Defence Education Environment Health Transport Welfare 
POLICYt-1 -.39** 
(.09) 
-.05 
(.07) 
-.10 
(.13) 
-.02 
(.04) 
-.17 
(.24) 
.08 
(.06) 
PREFSt-1 .01** 
(.00) 
.11** 
(.03) 
.02** 
(.01) 
.10** 
(.02) 
.01 
(.01) 
.10* 
(.05) 
PARTYt -.97** 
(.28) 
-2.29** 
(.72) 
.37 
(.27) 
-1.69* 
(.71) 
-.27 
(.65) 
-6.87** 
(1.31) 
Constant 5.52** 
(1.27) 
-0.88 
(3.58) 
-0.22 
(1.02) 
-0.81 
(1.72) 
3.27 
(5.12) 
1.09 
(4.37) 
R2 .45 .52 .35 .64 .17 .68 
N 16 16 16 16 16 16 
 
** p ≤ .01 , * p ≤ .05 , two-tailed tests. 
Notes. The table reports analyses of policy representation in Canada based on seemingly 
unrelated regression (SUR) models. The dependent variable is POLICY CHANGE (t). For the 
definition of the independent variables, please refer to the paper. 
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Table S38. SUR Models of Policy Representation in Canada (Lagged 
Dependent Variable Omitted) 
 
Canada 
 Defence Education Environment Health Transport Welfare 
PREFSt-1 .01** 
(.01) 
.12** 
(.03) 
.02** 
(.01) 
.10** 
(.02) 
.02 
(.01) 
.11** 
(.04) 
PARTYt -.34 
(.28) 
-2.70** 
(.66) 
.22 
(.20) 
-1.85** 
(.67) 
.02 
(.49) 
-5.94** 
(1.02) 
Constant 0.18 
(0.24) 
-3.90* 
(1.62) 
1.00* 
(0.43) 
-1.66* 
(0.78) 
-0.40 
(0.41) 
7.12** 
(1.00) 
R2 .18 .48 .29 .65 .11 .69 
N 16 16 16 16 16 16 
 
** p ≤ .01 , * p ≤ .05 , two-tailed tests. 
Notes. The table reports analyses of policy representation in Canada based on seemingly 
unrelated regression (SUR) models. The dependent variable is POLICY CHANGE (t). For the 
definition of the independent variables, please refer to the paper. 
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Table S39. SUR Models of Policy Representation in the UK 
 
United Kingdom 
 Defence Education Health Pensions Roads 
POLICYt-1 .50** 
(.17) 
-.05 
(.07) 
.02 
(.05) 
-.16 
(.11) 
-.35 
(.22) 
PREFSt-1 .05** 
(.02) 
.08* 
(.03) 
.07* 
(.03) 
.02 
(.03) 
-.04 
(.04) 
PARTYt − − − − − 
 
Constant -13.44** 
(4.76) 
-3.70 
(2.42) 
-4.57 
(2.00) 
3.76 
(2.40) 
5.90 
(4.01) 
R2 .35 .26 .36 .10 .03 
N 15 15 15 15 15 
 
** p ≤ .01 , * p ≤ .05 , two-tailed tests. 
Notes. The table reports analyses of policy representation in the UK based on seemingly 
unrelated regression (SUR) models. The dependent variable is POLICY CHANGE (t). For the 
definition of the independent variables, please refer to the paper. 
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Table S40. SUR Models of Policy Representation in the UK (Lagged 
Dependent Variable Omitted) 
 
United Kingdom 
 Defence Education Health Pensions Roads 
PREFSt-1 .02 
(.01) 
.08** 
(.03) 
.07** 
(.03) 
-.01 
(.02) 
.02 
(.03) 
PARTYt − − − − − 
 
Constant 0.42 
(0.47) 
-5.21* 
(2.13) 
-4.25* 
(2.00) 
1.09 
(1.61) 
-0.93 
(1.30) 
R2 .13 .21 .34 .02 .02 
N 15 15 15 15 15 
 
** p ≤ .01 , * p ≤ .05 , two-tailed tests. 
Notes. The table reports analyses of policy representation in the UK based on seemingly 
unrelated regression (SUR) models. The dependent variable is POLICY CHANGE (t). For the 
definition of the independent variables, please refer to the paper. 
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Table S41. SUR Models of Policy Representation in the US 
 
United States 
 Cities Crime Defence Education Environment Foreign 
Aid 
Health Space Welfare 
POLICYt-1 -.30** 
(.09) 
-.08 
(.06) 
.04 
(.04) 
-.05 
(.10) 
-.18** 
(.06) 
-.47** 
(.13) 
-.01 
(.02) 
-.09** 
(.03) 
.05 
(.04) 
PREFSt-1 -.04 
(.03) 
-.09 
(.07) 
.72** 
(.10) 
.28* 
(.12) 
.07** 
(.02) 
.12 
(.08) 
.62** 
(.12) 
.06** 
(.01) 
.31* 
(.13) 
PARTY 
PRESt 
.86 
(.46) 
.23 
(.75) 
-13.85** 
(4.68) 
-.87 
(1.88) 
.83 
(.47) 
-1.99* 
(.91) 
.97 
(1.52) 
-.24 
(.21) 
2.93 
(3.07) 
PARTY 
HOUSEt 
.15** 
(.04) 
-.13 
(.08) 
-1.08** 
(.37) 
.23 
(.20) 
.05 
(.04) 
.03 
(.09) 
-.04 
(.15) 
.02 
(.02) 
.64* 
(.27) 
Constant -4.22 
(2.31) 
14.95* 
(6.90) 
64.20* 
(27.78) 
-24.65 
(15.86) 
-2.56 
(3.39) 
14.39** 
(5.06) 
-29.14** 
(9.90) 
1.68 
(1.16) 
-26.93 
(16.86) 
R2 .28 .09 .63 .11 .28 .23 .59 .38 .21 
N 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 
 
** p ≤ .01 , * p ≤ .05 , two-tailed tests. 
Notes. The table reports analyses of policy representation in the US based on seemingly 
unrelated regression (SUR) models. The dependent variable is POLICY CHANGE (t). For the 
definition of the independent variables, please refer to the paper. 
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Table S42. SUR Models of Policy Representation in the US (Lagged 
Dependent Variable Omitted) 
 
United States 
 Cities Crime Defence Education Environment Foreign 
Aid 
Health Space Welfare 
PREFSt-1 .04 
(.02) 
-.03 
(.05) 
.77** 
(.09) 
.26* 
(.11) 
.07** 
(.02) 
.04 
(.09) 
.60** 
(.07) 
.06** 
(.01) 
.32* 
(.13) 
PARTY 
PRESt 
.27 
(.45) 
.11 
(.75) 
-16.47** 
(4.27) 
-.91 
(1.88) 
.41 
(.49) 
-.72 
(.97) 
.82 
(1.37) 
-.28 
(.21) 
3.71 
(2.98) 
PARTY 
HOUSEt 
.09* 
(.04) 
-.08 
(.07) 
-1.21** 
(.35) 
.25 
(.20) 
.08 
(.04) 
-.03 
(.10) 
-.01 
(.12) 
.04* 
(.02) 
.40 
(.21) 
Constant -6.52** 
(2.36) 
6.75 
(3.96) 
84.79** 
(19.50) 
-26.77 
(15.25) 
-7.54** 
(2.68) 
4.66 
(5.19) 
-30.56** 
(8.93) 
-0.12 
(0.97) 
-9.17 
(10.53) 
R2 .19 .07 .64 .10 .22 .03 .60 .36 .17 
N 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 
 
** p ≤ .01 , * p ≤ .05 , two-tailed tests. 
Notes. The table reports analyses of policy representation in the US based on seemingly 
unrelated regression (SUR) models. The dependent variable is POLICY CHANGE (t). For the 
definition of the independent variables, please refer to the paper. 
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Table S43. SUR Models of Public Responsiveness in Canada 
 
Canada 
 Defence Education Environment Health Transport Welfare 
PREFSt-1 .69** 
(.12) 
.70** 
(.12) 
.79** 
(.10) 
.74** 
(.13) 
.81** 
(.09) 
.73** 
(.13) 
POLICYt -5.77** 
(2.03) 
-.05 
(.25) 
-3.22 
(1.76) 
.27 
(.24) 
-3.09** 
(.89) 
.00 
(.14) 
Constant 72.79** 
(25.89) 
13.47 
(11.65) 
38.47* 
(17.87) 
-0.24 
(11.16) 
64.56** 
(17.65) 
-3.11 
(11.54) 
R2 .70 .80 .74 .84 .88 .66 
N 16 16 16 16 16 16 
 
** p ≤ .01 , * p ≤ .05 , two-tailed tests. 
Notes. The table reports analyses of public responsiveness in Canada with coefficients and 
standard errors in parentheses, based on seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) models. The 
dependent variable is PREFS (t). For the definition of the independent variables, please refer 
to the paper. 
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Table S44. SUR Models of Public Responsiveness in Canada (Lagged 
Dependent Variable Omitted) 
 
Canada 
 Defence Education Environment Health Transport Welfare 
POLICYt -4.52* 
(2.01) 
1.34** 
(.19) 
-9.00** 
(1.40) 
1.41** 
(.17) 
-5.57** 
(.73) 
.02 
(.13) 
Constant 54.46* 
(25.95) 
-21.01 
(11.23) 
127.32** 
(12.60) 
-
30.99** 
(10.70) 
124.04** 
(14.50) 
-13.69 
(11.50) 
R2 .10 .39 .20 .55 .31 -.01 
N 16 16 16 16 16 16 
 
** p ≤ .01 , * p ≤ .05 , two-tailed tests. 
Notes. The table reports analyses of public responsiveness in Canada with coefficients and 
standard errors in parentheses, based on seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) models. The 
dependent variable is PREFS (t). For the definition of the independent variables, please refer 
to the paper. 
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Table S45. SUR Models of Public Responsiveness in the UK 
 
United Kingdom 
 Defence Education Health Pensions Roads 
PREFSt-1 .47** 
(.13) 
.53** 
(.15) 
.84** 
(.07) 
.86** 
(.12) 
.64** 
(.15) 
POLICYt -4.92** 
(1.24) 
.16 
(.36) 
-.13 
(.12) 
-.24 
(.49) 
-3.02** 
(.85) 
Constant 129.23** 
(34.92) 
28.84 
(10.72) 
17.97** 
(4.37) 
18.83 
(9.95) 
49.59** 
(14.52) 
R2 .69 .59 .92 .86 .80 
N 16 16 16 16 16 
 
** p ≤ .01 , * p ≤ .05 , two-tailed tests. 
Notes. The table reports analyses of public responsiveness in the UK with coefficients and 
standard errors in parentheses, based on seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) models. The 
dependent variable is PREFS (t). For the definition of the independent variables, please refer 
to the paper. 
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Table S46. SUR Models of Public Responsiveness in the UK (Lagged 
Dependent Variable Omitted) 
 
United Kingdom 
 Defence Education Health Pensions Roads 
POLICYt -5.96** 
(1.34) 
.67* 
(.34) 
.29 
(.22) 
1.38** 
(.50) 
-5.03** 
(1.01) 
Constant 147.25** 
(39.38) 
48.44** 
(12.01) 
67.19** 
(8.36) 
31.85* 
(15.42) 
102.34** 
(11.47) 
R2 .49 .31 .21 .43 .58 
N 16 16 16 16 16 
 
** p ≤ .01 , * p ≤ .05 , two-tailed tests. 
Notes. The table reports analyses of public responsiveness in the UK with coefficients and 
standard errors in parentheses, based on seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) models. The 
dependent variable is PREFS (t). For the definition of the independent variables, please refer 
to the paper. 
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Table S47. SUR Models of Public Responsiveness in the US 
 
United States 
 Cities Crime Defence Education Environment Foreign 
Aid 
Health Space Welfare 
PREFSt-1 .72** 
(.07) 
.59** 
(.11) 
.74** 
(.07) 
.94** 
(.04) 
.88** 
(.07) 
.97** 
(.09) 
.91** 
(.09) 
.91** 
(.06) 
.83** 
(.09) 
POLICYt -.60** 
(.20) 
-.18** 
(.07) 
-.07** 
(.02) 
-.05 
(.03) 
-.41* 
(.20) 
.11 
(.17) 
.00 
(.01) 
-.53* 
(.24) 
.02 
(.03) 
Constant 15.79** 
(4.12) 
28.40** 
(8.00) 
21.50** 
(6.94) 
6.18** 
(1.99) 
15.68* 
(6.30) 
-3.15 
(6.94) 
5.55 
(4.97) 
4.11 
(4.03) 
-6.15 
(4.33) 
R2 .72 .78 .74 .93 .71 .70 .85 .82 .63 
N 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 
 
** p ≤ .01 , * p ≤ .05 , two-tailed tests. 
Notes. The table reports analyses of public responsiveness in the US with coefficients and 
standard errors in parentheses, based on seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) models. The 
dependent variable is PREFS (t). For the definition of the independent variables, please refer 
to the paper. 
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Table S48. SUR Models of Public Responsiveness in the US (Lagged 
Dependent Variable Omitted) 
 
United States 
 Cities Crime Defence Education Environment Foreign 
Aid 
Health Space Welfare 
POLICYt -1.56** 
(.20) 
-.42** 
(.05) 
-.11** 
(.03) 
.31** 
(.07) 
-.45 
(.26) 
.11 
(.24) 
.08** 
(.01) 
.61 
(.42) 
.08* 
(.03) 
Constant 50.90** 
(2.19) 
69.17** 
(1.05) 
25.61** 
(9.52) 
44.24** 
(3.30) 
63.28** 
(6.13) 
-
66.63** 
(3.87) 
53.71** 
(1.28) 
-
39.65** 
(5.03) 
-37.18** 
(4.17) 
R2 .54 .61 .11 .31 .04 .02 .55 .06 .12 
N 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 
 
** p ≤ .01 , * p ≤ .05 , two-tailed tests. 
Notes. The table reports analyses of public responsiveness in the US with coefficients and 
standard errors in parentheses, based on seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) models. The 
dependent variable is PREFS (t). For the definition of the independent variables, please refer 
to the paper. 
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Table S49. SUR Models of Electoral Incentives Effects on Policy 
Representation in Canada: Lagged Dependent Variable Omitted 
 
Canada 
 Defence Education Environment Health Transport Welfare 
PREFSt-1 × 
MARGt-1  
-.00 
(.00) 
.01 
(.01) 
-.00** 
(.00) 
-.00 
(.01) 
.01 
(.01) 
-.02 
(.01) 
PREFSt-1 × 
LPRt 
-.36** 
(.14) 
-.38 
(.79) 
-.10 
(.13) 
-.51 
(.34) 
-.83 
(.66) 
-.94 
(.73) 
PREFSt-1 × 
POPt 
.00 
(.00) 
.01 
(.01) 
.00 
(.00) 
.00* 
(.00) 
-.00 
(.00) 
.00 
(.00) 
PREFSt-1 × 
POPt-1 
.00* 
(.00) 
.01 
(.01) 
.00** 
(.00) 
.00 
(.00) 
.00 
(.00) 
-.02** 
(.01) 
PREFSt-1 × 
GPVt 
.00 
(.00) 
.00 
(.00) 
.00 
(.00) 
.00 
(.00) 
-.00 
(.00) 
.00 
(.00) 
PREFSt-1 × 
GPVt-1 
.00** 
(.00) 
.00 
(.00) 
.00** 
(.00) 
.00 
(.00) 
.00 
(.00) 
-.01** 
(.00) 
PREFSt-1 × 
FPVt 
.00 
(.00) 
.00 
(.00) 
.00 
(.00) 
.00 
(.00) 
-.00* 
(.00) 
.00 
(.01) 
PREFSt-1 × 
FPVt-1 
.00** 
(.00) 
.00 
(.00) 
.00** 
(.00) 
.00 
(.00) 
.00 
(.00) 
-.01** 
(.00) 
PREFSt-1 × 
GPUt 
.00 
(.01) 
.13* 
(.06) 
.02 
(.01) 
.00 
(.03) 
.02 
(.03) 
-.04 
(.08) 
PREFSt-1 × 
GPUt-1 
.00 
(.01) 
.01 
(.06) 
.01 
(.02) 
.04 
(.04) 
.06** 
(.02) 
.03 
(.10) 
PREFSt-1 × 
FPUt 
-.04 
(.04) 
-.40* 
(.18) 
.01 
(.04) 
.04 
(.11) 
.21 
(.13) 
-.13 
(.15) 
PREFSt-1 × 
FPUt-1 
-.02 
(.13) 
-.07 
(.18) 
-.01 
(.03) 
-.12 
(.24) 
-.43 
(1.67) 
9.97 
(13.03) 
PREFSt-1 × 
ELECYEARt 
-.00 
(.01) 
.05 
(.06) 
-.02 
(.01) 
-.01 
(.03) 
.04 
(.02) 
-.02 
(.10) 
PREFSt-1 × 
ELECPROXt 
.00 
(.00) 
-.04* 
(.02) 
-.00 
(.00) 
-.01 
(.01) 
-.03** 
(.01) 
.00 
(.04) 
 
** p ≤ .01 , * p ≤ .05 , two-tailed tests. 
Notes. The analysis replicates the models in Table 3 while omitting the lagged dependent 
variable (footnote 12 in the paper). The table reports the coefficients and standard errors in 
parentheses for the interaction between public preferences and electoral incentive based on 
seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) models. The dependent variable is POLICY CHANGE 
(t). For the interpretation of the coefficients please refer to Table 1 in the paper. The definition 
of the independent variables is in the paper. 
 49 
Table S50. SUR Models of Electoral Incentives Effects on Policy 
Representation in the UK: Lagged Dependent Variable Omitted 
 
United Kingdom 
 Defence Education Health Pensions Roads 
PREFSt-1 × 
MARGt-1  
.01 
(.01) 
.01 
(.01) 
.00 
(.01) 
.00 
(.01) 
-.01 
(.01) 
PREFSt-1 × 
LPRt 
-.12 
(.18) 
.02 
(.18) 
-.04 
(.15) 
-.06 
(.12) 
.24 
(.23) 
PREFSt-1 × 
POPt 
.00 
(.00) 
.00 
(.01) 
.00 
(.00) 
.00 
(.00) 
-.01 
(.01) 
PREFSt-1 × 
POPt-1 
.00 
(.00) 
.00 
(.01) 
-.00 
(.01) 
.00 
(.01) 
-.00 
(.01) 
PREFSt-1 × 
GPVt 
.00 
(.00) 
-.00 
(.00) 
-.00 
(.00) 
.00 
(.00) 
-.00 
(.00) 
PREFSt-1 × 
GPVt-1 
.00 
(.00) 
.00 
(.00) 
-.00 
(.00) 
.00 
(.00) 
-.00 
(.00) 
PREFSt-1 × 
FPVt 
.00 
(.00) 
.01* 
(.00) 
.00 
(.00) 
.00 
(.00) 
-.00 
(.00) 
PREFSt-1 × 
FPVt-1 
.01* 
(.00) 
.01 
(.00) 
-.00 
(.00) 
-.00 
(.00) 
-.00 
(.00) 
PREFSt-1 × 
FPUt 
.16 
(.12) 
.08 
(.05) 
.07 
(.05) 
.09* 
(.04) 
-.14 
(.09) 
PREFSt-1 × 
FPUt-1 
-.04 
(.06) 
-.11 
(.09) 
.11 
(.08) 
-.04 
(.05) 
.19** 
(.07) 
PREFSt-1 × 
ELECYEARt 
-.00 
(.13) 
.08 
(.09) 
.06 
(.06) 
-.03 
(.06) 
-.17 
(.12) 
PREFSt-1 × 
ELECPROXt 
-.02 
(.02) 
-.03 
(.03) 
-.03 
(.02) 
.00 
(.02) 
-.01 
(.03) 
 
** p ≤ .01 , * p ≤ .05 , two-tailed tests. 
Notes. The analysis replicates the models in Table 3 while omitting the lagged dependent 
variable (footnote 12 in the paper). The table reports the coefficients and standard errors in 
parentheses for the interaction between public preferences and electoral incentive based on 
seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) models. The dependent variable is POLICY CHANGE 
(t). For the interpretation of the coefficients please refer to Table 1 in the paper. The definition 
of the independent variables is in the paper. 
 
 
 
 50 
Table S51. SUR Models of Electoral Incentives Effects on Policy 
Representation in the US: Lagged Dependent Variable Omitted 
 
United States 
 Cities Crime Defence Education Environment Foreign 
Aid 
Health Space Welfare 
PREFSt-1 
× 
MARGt-1  
-.01 
(.01) 
.06* 
(.02) 
-.09 
(.06) 
-.05 
(.03) 
-.01 
(.01) 
-.02 
(.03) 
-.00 
(.02) 
-.01* 
(.00) 
.04 
(.02) 
PREFSt-1 
× LPRt 
.22 
(.17) 
.12 
(.37) 
-.97 
(.87) 
.61 
(.70) 
.14 
(.21) 
.35 
(.38) 
.18 
(.46) 
-.02 
(.07) 
-.47 
(.39) 
PREFSt-1 
× POPt 
-.01 
(.00) 
.01 
(.02) 
-.01 
(.02) 
-.03* 
(.02) 
.00 
(.00) 
-.02 
(.01) 
-.00 
(.02) 
-.00 
(.00) 
.01 
(.01) 
PREFSt-1 
× POPt-1 
.00 
(.00) 
-.01 
(.02) 
-.01 
(.03) 
-.02 
(.02) 
-.00 
(.01) 
-.01 
(.02) 
-.01 
(.01) 
.00 
(.00) 
.01 
(.01) 
PREFSt-1 
× GPVt 
-.00 
(.00) 
.00 
(.01) 
-.00 
(.01) 
-.02* 
(.01) 
.00 
(.00) 
-.01 
(.01) 
-.00 
(.01) 
-.00 
(.00) 
.01 
(.01) 
PREFSt-1 
× GPVt-1 
.00 
(.00) 
-.00 
(.01) 
-.01 
(.02) 
-.01 
(.01) 
-.00 
(.00) 
-.00 
(.01) 
-.01 
(.01) 
.00 
(.00) 
.01 
(.01) 
PREFSt-1 
× GPUt 
-.16* 
(.08) 
.20* 
(.10) 
.41 
(.32) 
2.79** 
(.74) 
.08 
(.14) 
.13 
(.16) 
.45* 
(.19) 
-.02 
(.03) 
-.13 
(.19) 
PREFSt-1 
× GPUt-1 
-.01 
(.06) 
-.29* 
(.13) 
1.04* 
(.49) 
1.45 
(1.09) 
.20 
(.24) 
.22 
(.18) 
.54** 
(.20) 
-.03 
(.04) 
-.18 
(.21) 
PREFSt-1 
× ELEC 
YEARt 
.10 
(.05) 
-.33** 
(.10) 
.11 
(.23) 
-.22 
(.18) 
-.08 
(.05) 
.17 
(.15) 
.11 
(.15) 
-.04* 
(.02) 
-.22 
(.20) 
PREFSt-1 
× ELEC 
PROXt 
-.02 
(.02) 
.15** 
(.04) 
-.20** 
(.07) 
.04 
(.08) 
.04 
(.02) 
-.05 
(.05) 
-.09 
(.06) 
.01* 
(.01) 
.08 
(.07) 
 
** p ≤ .01 , * p ≤ .05 , two-tailed tests. 
Notes. The analysis replicates the models in Table 3 while omitting the lagged dependent 
variable (footnote 12 in the paper). The table reports the coefficients and standard errors in 
parentheses for the interaction between public preferences and electoral incentive based on 
seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) models. The dependent variable is POLICY CHANGE 
(t). For the interpretation of the coefficients please refer to Table 1 in the paper. The definition 
of the independent variables is in the paper. 
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Table S52. Electoral Vulnerability Hypothesis in Canada: Controlling for 
Election Year 
 
Canada 
 Defence Education Environment Health Transport Welfare 
PREFSt-1 × 
MARGt-1  
-.00 
(.00) 
.00 
(.01) 
-.01** 
(.00) 
-.01 
(.01) 
.00 
(.01) 
.02 
(.02) 
PREFSt-1 × 
LPRt 
-.26 
(.17) 
-.50 
(.85) 
-.26 
(.10) 
-.63 
(.42) 
2.21** 
(.79) 
-.27 
(1.29) 
PREFSt-1 × 
POPt 
-.00 
(.00) 
.00 
(.01) 
.00 
(.00) 
.01 
(.00) 
-.01** 
(.00) 
.00 
(.01) 
PREFSt-1 × 
POPt-1 
.00 
(.00) 
.01** 
(.00) 
.00** 
(.00) 
.01 
(.01) 
-.00 
(.00) 
-.04** 
(.01) 
PREFSt-1 × 
GPVt 
-.00 
(.00) 
.00 
(.00) 
.00 
(.00) 
.00 
(.00) 
-.01** 
(.00) 
.00 
(.00) 
PREFSt-1 × 
GPVt-1 
.00** 
(.00) 
.00 
(.00) 
.00** 
(.00) 
-.00 
(.00) 
-.00 
(.00) 
-.02** 
(.00) 
PREFSt-1 × 
FPVt 
-.00 
(.00) 
.00 
(.00) 
.00 
(.00) 
.00 
(.00) 
-.00** 
(.00) 
.00 
(.01) 
PREFSt-1 × 
FPVt-1 
.00** 
(.00) 
.01* 
(.00) 
.00** 
(.00) 
-.00 
(.00) 
-.00 
(.00) 
-.02** 
(.00) 
PREFSt-1 × 
GPUt 
.02** 
(.01) 
.10* 
(.05) 
.03** 
(.01) 
-.02 
(.03) 
.02 
(.03) 
-.26** 
(.09) 
PREFSt-1 × 
GPUt-1 
.03** 
(.01) 
.02 
(.06) 
.00 
(.01) 
-.02 
(.03) 
.10** 
(.02) 
-.14 
(.11) 
PREFSt-1 × 
FPUt 
-.05 
(.04) 
-.43 
(.23) 
-.01 
(.05) 
.07 
(.13) 
.18 
(.13) 
.00 
(.19) 
PREFSt-1 × 
FPUt-1 
-.04 
(.09) 
-.06 
(.14) 
-.01 
(.03) 
.12 
(.24) 
.12 
(1.57) 
16.21 
(8.70) 
 
** p ≤ .01 , * p ≤ .05 , two-tailed tests. 
Notes. The analyses test the Electoral Vulnerability Hypothesis using each measure in turn 
and controlling for the variable Election Year (footnote 16 in the paper). The table reports the 
coefficients and standard errors in parentheses for the interaction between public preferences 
and the electoral vulnerability measures based on seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) 
models. The dependent variable is POLICY CHANGE (t). For the interpretation of the 
coefficients please refer to Table 1 in the paper. The definition of the independent variables is 
in the paper. 
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Table S53. Electoral Vulnerability Hypothesis in the UK: Controlling for 
Election Year 
 
United Kingdom 
 Defence Education Health Pensions Roads 
PREFSt-1 × 
MARGt-1  
.02* 
(.01) 
.01 
(.01) 
.00 
(.02) 
-.02 
(.02) 
-.01 
(.01) 
PREFSt-1 × 
LPRt 
-.39** 
(.14) 
.01 
(.21) 
-.16 
(.23) 
.63* 
(.25) 
.08 
(.24) 
PREFSt-1 × 
POPt 
.00 
(.00) 
.00 
(.01) 
.01 
(.00) 
-.01 
(.00) 
-.01 
(.00) 
PREFSt-1 × 
POPt-1 
.01** 
(.00) 
-.00 
(.01) 
-.00 
(.01) 
-.01 
(.01) 
-.01 
(.01) 
PREFSt-1 × 
GPVt 
.00 
(.00) 
-.00 
(.00) 
.00 
(.00) 
-.00 
(.00) 
-.00 
(.00) 
PREFSt-1 × 
GPVt-1 
.01** 
(.00) 
-.00 
(.00) 
-.00 
(.00) 
-.00 
(.00) 
-.00 
(.00) 
PREFSt-1 × 
FPVt 
.00 
(.00) 
.01* 
(.00) 
.00 
(.00) 
-.00 
(.00) 
-.00 
(.00) 
PREFSt-1 × 
FPVt-1 
.01** 
(.00) 
.00 
(.00) 
-.00 
(.00) 
-.00 
(.00) 
-.00 
(.00) 
PREFSt-1 × 
FPUt 
.25** 
(.10) 
.09 
(.05) 
.06 
(.05) 
.07 
(.04) 
-.14 
(.09) 
PREFSt-1 × 
FPUt-1 
.02 
(.04) 
-.13 
(.09) 
.06 
(.07) 
-.07 
(.05) 
.21** 
(.07) 
 
** p ≤ .01 , * p ≤ .05 , two-tailed tests. 
Notes. The analyses test the Electoral Vulnerability Hypothesis using each measure in turn 
and controlling for the variable Election Year (footnote 16 in the paper). The table reports the 
coefficients and standard errors in parentheses for the interaction between public preferences 
and the electoral vulnerability measures based on seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) 
models. The dependent variable is POLICY CHANGE (t). For the interpretation of the 
coefficients please refer to Table 1 in the paper. The definition of the independent variables is 
in the paper. 
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Table S54. Electoral Vulnerability Hypothesis in the US: Controlling for 
Election Year 
 
United States 
 Cities Crime Defence Education Environment Foreign 
Aid 
Health Space Welfare 
PREFSt-1 
× 
MARGt-1  
-.01 
(.01) 
.10** 
(.03) 
-.10 
(.06) 
-.09** 
(.03) 
-.02 
(.01) 
-.03 
(.02) 
.02 
(.03) 
-.00 
(.00) 
.06* 
(.02) 
PREFSt-1 
× LPRt 
.19 
(.17) 
.09 
(.41) 
-.87 
(.89) 
.27 
(.66) 
.23 
(.19) 
.04 
(.37) 
.45 
(.56) 
-.11 
(.08) 
-.47 
(.38) 
PREFSt-1 
× POPt 
-.01 
(.00) 
.03 
(.02) 
-.00 
(.03) 
-.07** 
(.02) 
.00 
(.01) 
-.02 
(.01) 
-.01 
(.02) 
-.00 
(.00) 
.02 
(.01) 
PREFSt-1 
× POPt-1 
-.00 
(.00) 
.00 
(.02) 
-.02 
(.04) 
-.01 
(.02) 
-.00 
(.01) 
-.01 
(.01) 
-.03 
(.02) 
.00 
(.00) 
.01 
(.01) 
PREFSt-1 
× GPVt 
-.00 
(.00) 
.01 
(.01) 
-.00 
(.01) 
-.04** 
(.01) 
.00 
(.00) 
-.01 
(.01) 
-.00 
(.01) 
-.00 
(.00) 
.01 
(.01) 
PREFSt-1 
× GPVt-1 
-.00 
(.00) 
.00 
(.01) 
-.01 
(.02) 
-.01 
(.01) 
-.00 
(.00) 
-.00 
(.01) 
-.01 
(.01) 
.00 
(.00) 
.01 
(.01) 
PREFSt-1 
× GPUt 
-.18* 
(.07) 
.31** 
(.10) 
.58 
(.32) 
2.52** 
(.69) 
.11 
(.12) 
-.16 
(.14) 
.37* 
(.18) 
-.04 
(.03) 
-.17 
(.19) 
PREFSt-1 
× GPUt-1 
-.02 
(.06) 
-.21 
(.12) 
1.09* 
(.49) 
1.72 
(1.09) 
.43* 
(.18) 
-.03 
(.18) 
.58** 
(.19) 
-.05 
(.04) 
-.25 
(.21) 
 
** p ≤ .01 , * p ≤ .05 , two-tailed tests. 
Notes. The analyses test the Electoral Vulnerability Hypothesis using each measure in turn 
and controlling for the variable Election Year (footnote 16 in the paper). The table reports the 
coefficients and standard errors in parentheses for the interaction between public preferences 
and the electoral vulnerability measures based on seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) 
models. The dependent variable is POLICY CHANGE (t). For the interpretation of the 
coefficients please refer to Table 1 in the paper. The definition of the independent variables is 
in the paper. 
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Table S55. Electoral Vulnerability Hypothesis in Canada: Controlling for 
Electoral Proximity 
 
Canada 
 Defence Education Environment Health Transport Welfare 
PREFSt-1 × 
MARGt-1  
-.00 
(.00) 
.00 
(.01) 
-.01** 
(.00) 
-.02 
(.01) 
.00 
(.01) 
.03* 
(.02) 
PREFSt-1 × 
LPRt 
-.37* 
(.18) 
-.83 
(.82) 
-.35** 
(.08) 
-.75 
(.47) 
1.22 
(.66) 
-.55 
(1.32) 
PREFSt-1 × 
POPt 
-.00 
(.00) 
.01 
(.01) 
.00 
(.00) 
.01* 
(.00) 
-.00* 
(.00) 
.00 
(.01) 
PREFSt-1 × 
POPt-1 
.00 
(.00) 
.01** 
(.00) 
.00** 
(.00) 
.01 
(.01) 
-.00 
(.00) 
-.03** 
(.01) 
PREFSt-1 × 
GPVt 
-.00 
(.00) 
.00 
(.00) 
.00 
(.00) 
.00 
(.00) 
-.00* 
(.00) 
.00 
(.00) 
PREFSt-1 × 
GPVt-1 
.00** 
(.00) 
.00 
(.00) 
.00** 
(.00) 
.00 
(.00) 
-.00 
(.00) 
-.02** 
(.00) 
PREFSt-1 × 
FPVt 
-.00 
(.00) 
.00 
(.00) 
.00 
(.00) 
.00 
(.00) 
-.00* 
(.00) 
.00 
(.01) 
PREFSt-1 × 
FPVt-1 
.00** 
(.00) 
.01* 
(.00) 
.00** 
(.00) 
.00 
(.00) 
-.00 
(.00) 
-.02** 
(.00) 
PREFSt-1 × 
GPUt 
.02** 
(.01) 
.13* 
(.05) 
.03* 
(.01) 
-.01 
(.03) 
.03 
(.02) 
-.21* 
(.10) 
PREFSt-1 × 
GPUt-1 
.03** 
(.01) 
-.01 
(.06) 
.01 
(.01) 
.00 
(.04) 
.08** 
(.02) 
-.14 
(.11) 
PREFSt-1 × 
FPUt 
-.07 
(.04) 
-.36 
(.24) 
-.03 
(.05) 
.05 
(.15) 
.05 
(.14) 
.08 
(.20) 
PREFSt-1 × 
FPUt-1 
-.03 
(.09) 
-.02 
(.15) 
-.02 
(.03) 
-.07 
(.23) 
.39 
(1.55) 
17.26* 
(8.68) 
 
** p ≤ .01 , * p ≤ .05 , two-tailed tests. 
Notes. The analyses test the Electoral Vulnerability Hypothesis using each measure in turn 
and controlling for the variable Electoral Proximity (footnote 16 in the paper). The table 
reports the coefficients and standard errors in parentheses for the interaction between public 
preferences and the electoral vulnerability measures based on seemingly unrelated regression 
(SUR) models. The dependent variable is POLICY CHANGE (t). For the interpretation of the 
coefficients please refer to Table 1 in the paper. The definition of the independent variables is 
in the paper. 
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Table S56. Electoral Vulnerability Hypothesis in the UK: Controlling for 
Electoral Proximity 
 
United Kingdom 
 Defence Education Health Pensions Roads 
PREFSt-1 × 
MARGt-1  
.02* 
(.01) 
.00 
(.01) 
-.01 
(.02) 
-.04** 
(.01) 
.01 
(.02) 
PREFSt-1 × 
LPRt 
-.45** 
(.14) 
.16 
(.22) 
-.07 
(.23) 
.69** 
(.15) 
-.12 
(.30) 
PREFSt-1 × 
POPt 
.00 
(.00) 
.00 
(.01) 
.01 
(.00) 
-.01 
(.00) 
-.01 
(.01) 
PREFSt-1 × 
POPt-1 
.01** 
(.00) 
-.00 
(.01) 
-.00 
(.01) 
-.01 
(.01) 
-.01 
(.01) 
PREFSt-1 × 
GPVt 
.00 
(.00) 
-.00 
(.00) 
.00 
(.00) 
-.00 
(.00) 
-.00 
(.00) 
PREFSt-1 × 
GPVt-1 
.01** 
(.00) 
-.00 
(.00) 
-.00 
(.00) 
-.00 
(.00) 
-.00 
(.00) 
PREFSt-1 × 
FPVt 
.00 
(.00) 
.01* 
(.00) 
.00 
(.00) 
-.00 
(.00) 
-.00 
(.00) 
PREFSt-1 × 
FPVt-1 
.00* 
(.00) 
.00 
(.00) 
-.00 
(.00) 
-.00 
(.00) 
-.00 
(.00) 
PREFSt-1 × 
FPUt 
.27** 
(.09) 
.10 
(.06) 
.04 
(.06) 
.05 
(.04) 
-.12 
(.10) 
PREFSt-1 × 
FPUt-1 
.06 
(.05) 
-.11 
(.09) 
.10 
(.07) 
-.06 
(.05) 
.19** 
(.07) 
 
** p ≤ .01 , * p ≤ .05 , two-tailed tests. 
Notes. The analyses test the Electoral Vulnerability Hypothesis using each measure in turn 
and controlling for the variable Electoral Proximity (footnote 16 in the paper). The table 
reports the coefficients and standard errors in parentheses for the interaction between public 
preferences and the electoral vulnerability measures based on seemingly unrelated regression 
(SUR) models. The dependent variable is POLICY CHANGE (t). For the interpretation of the 
coefficients please refer to Table 1 in the paper. The definition of the independent variables is 
in the paper. 
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Table S57. Electoral Vulnerability Hypothesis in the US: Controlling for 
Electoral Proximity 
 
United States 
 Cities Crime Defence Education Environment Foreign 
Aid 
Health Space Welfare 
PREFSt-1 
× 
MARGt-1  
-.01 
(.01) 
.10** 
(.03) 
-.11 
(.06) 
-.09** 
(.03) 
-.02 
(.01) 
-.03 
(.02) 
.02 
(.03) 
-.00 
(.00) 
.06** 
(.02) 
PREFSt-1 
× LPRt 
.17 
(.17) 
.07 
(.39) 
-.71 
(.88) 
.67 
(.69) 
.25 
(.19) 
.04 
(.37) 
.49 
(.56) 
-.12 
(.08) 
-.51 
(.39) 
PREFSt-1 
× POPt 
-.00 
(.00) 
.03 
(.02) 
-.01 
(.03) 
-.08** 
(.02) 
.00 
(.01) 
-.02 
(.01) 
-.01 
(.02) 
-.00 
(.00) 
.02 
(.01) 
PREFSt-1 
× POPt-1 
-.00 
(.00) 
.00 
(.02) 
-.02 
(.04) 
-.03 
(.02) 
-.00 
(.01) 
-.01 
(.01) 
-.03 
(.02) 
.00 
(.00) 
.01 
(.01) 
PREFSt-1 
× GPVt 
-.00 
(.00) 
.01 
(.01) 
-.00 
(.01) 
-.04** 
(.01) 
.00 
(.00) 
-.01 
(.01) 
-.00 
(.01) 
-.00 
(.00) 
.01 
(.01) 
PREFSt-1 
× GPVt-1 
-.00 
(.00) 
.00 
(.01) 
-.01 
(.02) 
-.01 
(.01) 
-.00 
(.00) 
-.00 
(.01) 
-.01 
(.01) 
.00 
(.00) 
.01 
(.01) 
PREFSt-1 
× GPUt 
-.19* 
(.07) 
.32** 
(.10) 
.55 
(.33) 
2.68** 
(.74) 
.11 
(.12) 
-.16 
(.14) 
.38* 
(.17) 
-.04 
(.03) 
-.17 
(.19) 
PREFSt-1 
× GPUt-1 
-.01 
(.05) 
-.22 
(.12) 
1.07* 
(.49) 
1.80 
(1.22) 
.44* 
(.18) 
-.03 
(.17) 
.58** 
(.19) 
-.05 
(.04) 
-.27 
(.21) 
 
** p ≤ .01 , * p ≤ .05 , two-tailed tests. 
Notes. The analyses test the Electoral Vulnerability Hypothesis using each measure in turn 
and controlling for the variable Electoral Proximity (footnote 16 in the paper). The table 
reports the coefficients and standard errors in parentheses for the interaction between public 
preferences and the electoral vulnerability measures based on seemingly unrelated regression 
(SUR) models. The dependent variable is POLICY CHANGE (t). For the interpretation of the 
coefficients please refer to Table 1 in the paper. The definition of the independent variables is 
in the paper. 
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Table S58. Electoral Proximity Hypothesis in Canada: Controlling for 
Electoral Vulnerability Measures (I) 
 
Canada 
 Defence Education Environment Health Transport Welfare 
MARGt-1  -.01 
(.00) 
.01 
(.07) 
-.01 
(.01) 
-.01 
(.03) 
.04 
(.02) 
.00 
(.10) 
LPRt -.01 
(.01) 
.02 
(.07) 
-.01 
(.01) 
-.01 
(.03) 
.04 
(.02) 
-.01 
(.09) 
POPt .00 
(.01) 
.06 
(.06) 
-.03** 
(.01) 
-.00 
(.03) 
.06* 
(.01) 
-.13 
(.10) 
POPt-1 .01 
(.00) 
.01 
(.06) 
-.02 
(.01) 
.00 
(.03) 
.02 
(.02) 
.08 
(.09) 
GPVt .00 
(.01) 
.04 
(.06) 
-.02* 
(.01) 
-.02 
(.03) 
.06 
(.02) 
-.16* 
(.08) 
GPVt-1 .01 
(.01) 
.03 
(.07) 
-.02 
(.01) 
.01 
(.03) 
.02 
(.02) 
.08 
(.09) 
FPVt .00 
(.02) 
.04 
(.07) 
-.02 
(.01) 
-.00 
(.04) 
.06* 
(.03) 
-.17 
(.11) 
FPVt-1 .01 
(.01) 
.03 
(.07) 
-.02 
(.01) 
.02 
(.03) 
.02 
(.03) 
.15 
(.08) 
GPUt -.00 
(.01) 
.03 
(.07) 
-.02 
(.01) 
-.02 
(.03) 
.04 
(.02) 
-.01 
(.10) 
GPUt-1 -.01 
(.01) 
.01 
(.05) 
-.03** 
(.01) 
.02 
(.03) 
.05* 
(.02) 
.09 
(.08) 
FPUt .00 
(.01) 
.04 
(.06) 
-.02 
(.01) 
-.01 
(.03) 
.05* 
(.02) 
-.11 
(.10) 
FPUt-1 -.00 
(.01) 
.03 
(.06) 
-.02 
(.01) 
.01 
(.03) 
.03 
(.02) 
.08 
(.08) 
 
** p ≤ .01 , * p ≤ .05 , two-tailed tests. 
Notes. The analyses test the Electoral Proximity Hypothesis controlling for each electoral 
vulnerability measure in turn (footnote 16 in the paper). The table reports the coefficients and 
standard errors in parentheses for the interaction between public preferences and the variable 
Election Year based on seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) models. The dependent 
variable is POLICY CHANGE (t). For the interpretation of the coefficients please refer to 
Table 1 in the paper. The definition of the independent variables is in the paper. 
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Table S59. Electoral Proximity Hypothesis in the UK: Controlling for 
Electoral Vulnerability Measures (I) 
 
United Kingdom 
 Defence Education Health Pensions Roads 
MARGt-1  -.01 
(.12) 
.07 
(.10) 
.12 
(.07) 
.02 
(.06) 
-.27* 
(.11) 
LPRt -.02 
(.11) 
.07 
(.10) 
.12 
(.07) 
.02 
(.06) 
-.27* 
(.13) 
POPt -.01 
(.09) 
.07 
(.09) 
.08 
(.06) 
-.03 
(.05) 
-.18 
(.11) 
POPt-1 -.18 
(.11) 
.07 
(.10) 
.08 
(.06) 
-.02 
(.05) 
-.21 
(.12) 
GPVt -.03 
(.09) 
.07 
(.09) 
.07 
(.06) 
-.03 
(.05) 
-.19 
(.12) 
GPVt-1 -.18 
(.11) 
.09 
(.10) 
.08 
(.06) 
-.01 
(.05) 
-.20 
(.12) 
FPVt -.01 
(.09) 
.08 
(.09) 
.08 
(.06) 
-.02 
(.06) 
-.13 
(.09) 
FPVt-1 -.18 
(.10) 
.06 
(.10) 
.06 
(.06) 
-.03 
(.05) 
-.18 
(.11) 
FPUt -.11 
(.12) 
-.01 
(.11) 
.09 
(.06) 
-.04 
(.06) 
-.23 
(.12) 
FPUt-1 -.03 
(.10) 
.11 
(.10) 
.10 
(.06) 
-.05 
(.06) 
-.18 
(.13) 
 
** p ≤ .01 , * p ≤ .05 , two-tailed tests. 
Notes. The analyses test the Electoral Proximity Hypothesis controlling for each electoral 
vulnerability measure in turn (footnote 16 in the paper). The table reports the coefficients and 
standard errors in parentheses for the interaction between public preferences and the variable 
Election Year based on seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) models. The dependent 
variable is POLICY CHANGE (t). For the interpretation of the coefficients please refer to 
Table 1 in the paper. The definition of the independent variables is in the paper. 
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Table S60. Electoral Proximity Hypothesis in the US: Controlling for 
Electoral Vulnerability Measures (I) 
 
United States 
 Cities Crime Defence Education Environment Foreign 
Aid 
Health Space Welfare 
MARGt-1  .12** 
(.04) 
-.30** 
(.09) 
.03 
(.22) 
-.21 
(.18) 
-.05 
(.04) 
.13 
(.13) 
.11 
(.15) 
-.03* 
(.01) 
-.28 
(.20) 
LPRt .12* 
(.05) 
-.35** 
(.09) 
-.01 
(.24) 
-.14 
(.19) 
-.02 
(04) 
.16 
(.13) 
.25 
(.15) 
-.04* 
(.02) 
-.20 
(.19) 
POPt .10* 
(.04) 
-.32** 
(.09) 
-.02 
(.22) 
-.14 
(.18) 
-.08 
(.04) 
.18 
(.12) 
.15 
(.15) 
-.03* 
(.02) 
-.32 
(.21) 
POPt-1 .07* 
(.03) 
-.37** 
(.09) 
-.10 
(.24) 
-.23 
(.16) 
.01 
(.03) 
.16 
(.12) 
.19 
(.14) 
-.03* 
(.02) 
-.22 
(.21) 
GPVt .10* 
(.04) 
-.32** 
(.09) 
-.02 
(.22) 
-.14 
(.18) 
-.08* 
(.04) 
.18 
(.12) 
.15 
(.15) 
-.03* 
(.02) 
-.32 
(.21) 
GPVt-1 .07* 
(.03) 
-.37** 
(.09) 
-.01 
(.02) 
-.01 
(.01) 
-.00 
(.00) 
-.00 
(.01) 
-.01 
(.01) 
.00 
(.00) 
.01 
(.01) 
GPUt .12** 
(.05) 
-.32** 
(.09) 
-.02 
(.23) 
-.23 
(.19) 
-.04 
(.04) 
.15 
(.12) 
.14 
(.15) 
-.03* 
(.02) 
-.35 
(.20) 
GPUt-1 .04 
(.03) 
-.33** 
(.09) 
.02 
(.24) 
-.26 
(.16) 
-.03 
(.04) 
.10 
(.13) 
.04 
(.12) 
-.03 
(.02) 
-.22 
(.21) 
 
** p ≤ .01 , * p ≤ .05 , two-tailed tests. 
Notes. The analyses test the Electoral Proximity Hypothesis controlling for each electoral 
vulnerability measure in turn (footnote 16 in the paper). The table reports the coefficients and 
standard errors in parentheses for the interaction between public preferences and the variable 
Election Year based on seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) models. The dependent 
variable is POLICY CHANGE (t). For the interpretation of the coefficients please refer to 
Table 1 in the paper. The definition of the independent variables is in the paper. 
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Table S61. Electoral Proximity Hypothesis in Canada: Controlling for 
Electoral Vulnerability Measures (II) 
 
Canada 
 Defence Education Environment Health Transport Welfare 
MARGt-1  .00 
(.00) 
-.03 
(.02) 
.00 
(.00) 
-.01 
(.01) 
-.03** 
(.01) 
-.00 
(.04) 
LPRt .00 
(.00) 
-.03 
(.02) 
.00 
(.00) 
-.01 
(.01) 
-.03** 
(.01) 
-.00 
(.04) 
POPt .00 
(.01) 
-.04* 
(.02) 
.00 
(.00) 
-.01 
(.01) 
-.03** 
(.01) 
.03 
(.03) 
POPt-1 -.01 
(.00) 
-.06** 
(.02) 
.00 
(.00) 
-.04** 
(.01) 
-.04** 
(.01) 
-.09* 
(.03) 
GPVt -.00 
(.01) 
-.04* 
(.02) 
.00 
(.00) 
-.00 
(.01) 
-.03** 
(.01) 
.06 
(.03) 
GPVt-1 -.01 
(.01) 
-.07** 
(.02) 
.01 
(.01) 
-.04** 
(.01) 
-.04** 
(.01) 
-.07 
(.04) 
FPVt -.00 
(.01) 
-.04* 
(.02) 
.00 
(.00) 
-.01 
(.01) 
-.03** 
(.01) 
.04 
(.04) 
FPVt-1 -.01 
(.00) 
-.06** 
(.02) 
.00 
(.00) 
-.04** 
(.01) 
-.04** 
(.01) 
-.08** 
(.03) 
GPUt .00 
(.01) 
-.04* 
(.02) 
.00 
(.00) 
-.01 
(.01) 
-.03 
(.01) 
.00 
(.04) 
GPUt-1 .00 
(.01) 
-.04* 
(.02) 
.01** 
(.00) 
-.03** 
(.01) 
-.04** 
(.01) 
-.08 
(.04) 
FPUt .00 
(.01) 
-.04** 
(.02) 
.00 
(.00) 
-.01 
(.01) 
-.03** 
(.01) 
.03 
(.04) 
FPUt-1 .00 
(.01) 
-.05* 
(.02) 
-.01 
(.01) 
-.03** 
(.01) 
-.04** 
(.01) 
-.06 
(.04) 
 
** p ≤ .01 , * p ≤ .05 , two-tailed tests. 
Notes. The analyses test the Electoral Proximity Hypothesis controlling for each electoral 
vulnerability measure in turn (footnote 16 in the paper). The table reports the coefficients and 
standard errors in parentheses for the interaction between public preferences and the variable 
Electoral Proximity based on seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) models. The dependent 
variable is POLICY CHANGE (t). For the interpretation of the coefficients please refer to 
Table 1 in the paper. The definition of the independent variables is in the paper. 
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Table S62. Electoral Proximity Hypothesis in the UK: Controlling for 
Electoral Vulnerability Measures (II) 
 
United Kingdom 
 Defence Education Health Pensions Roads 
MARGt-1  -.00 
(.02) 
-.00 
(.04) 
-.07** 
(.02) 
-.02 
(.02) 
-.00 
(.03) 
LPRt -.00 
(.02) 
-.01 
(.04) 
-.06* 
(.03) 
-.02 
(.02) 
-.03 
(.03) 
POPt .03* 
(.01) 
-.03 
(.03) 
-.03 
(.02) 
.00 
(.01) 
-.01 
(.03) 
POPt-1 .04* 
(.02) 
-.04 
(.04) 
-.02 
(.02) 
-.00 
(.02) 
-.04 
(.03) 
GPVt .03* 
(.01) 
-.03 
(.03) 
-.03 
(.02) 
.00 
(.01) 
-.02 
(.03) 
GPVt-1 .05** 
(.02) 
-.05 
(.04) 
-.03 
(.02) 
-.00 
(.02) 
-.05 
(.03) 
FPVt .01 
(.01) 
-.03 
(.03) 
-.03 
(.02) 
.00 
(.02) 
-.02 
(.02) 
FPVt-1 .02 
(.01) 
-.03 
(.03) 
-.02 
(.02) 
.01 
(.02) 
-.02 
(.03) 
FPUt -.00 
(.02) 
.03 
(.05) 
-.04 
(.02) 
.01 
(.02) 
-.04 
(.03) 
FPUt-1 .02 
(.02) 
-.05 
(.03) 
-.04* 
(.02) 
.00 
(.02) 
-.02 
(.03) 
 
** p ≤ .01 , * p ≤ .05 , two-tailed tests. 
Notes. The analyses test the Electoral Proximity Hypothesis controlling for each electoral 
vulnerability measure in turn (footnote 16 in the paper). The table reports the coefficients and 
standard errors in parentheses for the interaction between public preferences and the variable 
Electoral Proximity based on seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) models. The dependent 
variable is POLICY CHANGE (t). For the interpretation of the coefficients please refer to 
Table 1 in the paper. The definition of the independent variables is in the paper. 
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Table S63. Electoral Proximity Hypothesis in the US: Controlling for 
Electoral Vulnerability Measures (II) 
 
 Cities Crime Defence Education Environment Foreign 
Aid 
Health Space Welfare 
MARGt-1  -.02 
(.02) 
.14** 
(.03) 
-.19** 
(.07) 
.04 
(.07) 
.02 
(.02) 
-.04 
(.05) 
-.11* 
(.05) 
.01 
(.01) 
.10 
(.07) 
LPRt -.02 
(.02) 
.13** 
(.03) 
-.18* 
(.07) 
.02 
(.07) 
.02 
(02) 
-.03 
(.05) 
-.11* 
(.05) 
.01 
(.01) 
.10 
(.06) 
POPt -.01 
(.02) 
.12** 
(.03) 
-.16* 
(.07) 
.02 
(.07) 
.04* 
(.01) 
-.03 
(.05) 
-.10 
(.06) 
.00 
(.01) 
.09 
(.07) 
POPt-1 -.01 
(.01) 
.15** 
(.04) 
-.17* 
(.07) 
-.01 
(.07) 
-.00 
(.01) 
-.03 
(.04) 
-.13** 
(.05) 
.01 
(.01) 
.06 
(.07) 
GPVt -.01 
(.02) 
.12** 
(.03) 
-.16* 
(.07) 
.02 
(.07) 
.04* 
(.01) 
-.03 
(.05) 
-.10 
(.06) 
.00 
(.01) 
.09 
(.07) 
GPVt-1 -.01 
(.01) 
.15** 
(.04) 
-.17* 
(.07) 
-.01 
(.07) 
-.00 
(.01) 
-.03 
(.04) 
-.13** 
(.05) 
.01 
(.01) 
.06 
(.07) 
GPUt -.02 
(.02) 
.14** 
(.04) 
-.17* 
(.07) 
.02 
(.08) 
.02 
(.02) 
-.04 
(.04) 
-.11* 
(.06) 
.01 
(.01) 
.11 
(.07) 
GPUt-1 -.00 
(.01) 
.15** 
(.04) 
-.20** 
(.07) 
.07 
(.07) 
.02 
(.02) 
-.02 
(.05) 
-.11* 
(.05) 
.01 
(.01) 
.07 
(.07) 
 
** p ≤ .01 , * p ≤ .05 , two-tailed tests. 
Notes. The analyses test the Electoral Proximity Hypothesis controlling for each electoral 
vulnerability measure in turn (footnote 16 in the paper). The table reports the coefficients and 
standard errors in parentheses for the interaction between public preferences and the variable 
Electoral Proximity based on seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) models. The dependent 
variable is POLICY CHANGE (t). For the interpretation of the coefficients please refer to 
Table 1 in the paper. The definition of the independent variables is in the paper. 
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Table S64. SUR Models of Electoral Incentives Effects on Policy 
Representation in Canada: Controlling for GDP 
 
Canada 
 Defence Education Environment Health Transport Welfare 
PREFSt-1 × 
MARGt-1  
-.00 
(.00) 
-.02 
(.02) 
-.01** 
(.01) 
-.03 
(.01) 
.01 
(.01) 
.01 
(.02) 
PREFSt-1 × 
LPRt 
-.61** 
(.23) 
-1.42 
(.92) 
-.21 
(.14) 
-1.00* 
(.47) 
2.45** 
(.84) 
-.66 
(1.16) 
PREFSt-1 × 
POPt 
-.00 
(.00) 
.01 
(.01) 
.00 
(.00) 
.01** 
(.00) 
-.01* 
(.00) 
.00 
(.01) 
PREFSt-1 × 
POPt-1 
.00 
(.00) 
.03** 
(.00) 
.00** 
(.00) 
.00 
(.01) 
-.00 
(.00) 
-.03* 
(.01) 
PREFSt-1 × 
GPVt 
-.00 
(.00) 
.01 
(.00) 
.00 
(.00) 
.00** 
(.00) 
-.00** 
(.00) 
.00 
(.00) 
PREFSt-1 × 
GPVt-1 
.00* 
(.00) 
.01 
(.00) 
.00** 
(.00) 
-.00 
(.00) 
-.00 
(.00) 
-.01** 
(.00) 
PREFSt-1 × 
FPVt 
-.00 
(.00) 
.01* 
(.00) 
.00 
(.00) 
.01** 
(.00) 
-.00** 
(.00) 
.00 
(.00) 
PREFSt-1 × 
FPVt-1 
.00** 
(.00) 
.01** 
(.00) 
.00** 
(.00) 
.00 
(.00) 
-.00 
(.00) 
-.01** 
(.00) 
PREFSt-1 × 
GPUt 
.02* 
(.01) 
.13** 
(.05) 
.04** 
(.02) 
-.01 
(.03) 
.03 
(.03) 
-.14* 
(.07) 
PREFSt-1 × 
GPUt-1 
.03** 
(.01) 
.03 
(.07) 
-.01 
(.02) 
.04 
(.04) 
.07** 
(.02) 
.00 
(.09) 
PREFSt-1 × 
FPUt 
-.09* 
(.04) 
-.67 
(.36) 
-.03 
(.06) 
-.02 
(.19) 
.25 
(.16) 
.12 
(.20) 
PREFSt-1 × 
FPUt-1 
-.05 
(.10) 
.18 
(.28) 
.04 
(.04) 
.68* 
(.35) 
-.88 
(1.82) 
25.02* 
(12.49) 
PREFSt-1 × 
ELECYEARt 
.01 
(.01) 
.10 
(.07) 
-.01 
(.01) 
-.00 
(.03) 
.09** 
(.02) 
.08 
(.09) 
PREFSt-1 × 
ELECPROXt 
-.01 
(.01) 
-.07** 
(.02) 
-.00 
(.01) 
-.00 
(.01) 
-.04** 
(.01) 
-.00 
(.04) 
 
** p ≤ .01 , * p ≤ .05 , two-tailed tests. 
Notes. The analysis replicates the models in Table 3 while controlling for GDP (footnote 16 
in the paper). The table reports the coefficients and standard errors in parentheses for the 
interaction between public preferences and electoral incentive based on seemingly unrelated 
regression (SUR) models. The dependent variable is POLICY CHANGE (t). For the 
interpretation of the coefficients please refer to Table 1 in the paper. The definition of the 
independent variables is in the paper. 
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Table S65. SUR Models of Electoral Incentives Effects on Policy 
Representation in the UK: Controlling for GDP 
 
United Kingdom 
 Defence Education Health Pensions Roads 
PREFSt-1 × 
MARGt-1  
.03** 
(.01) 
.02 
(.01) 
.02 
(.01) 
.00 
(.01) 
-.01 
(.01) 
PREFSt-1 × 
LPRt 
-.37** 
(.14) 
-.03 
(.22) 
-.32 
(.22) 
.10 
(.13) 
.18 
(.14) 
PREFSt-1 × 
POPt 
.01* 
(.00) 
.00 
(.01) 
.01 
(.00) 
-.00 
(.00) 
-.00 
(.00) 
PREFSt-1 × 
POPt-1 
.01** 
(.00) 
-.00 
(.01) 
-.00 
(.01) 
-.00 
(.01) 
-.00 
(.00) 
PREFSt-1 × 
GPVt 
.00** 
(.00) 
-.00 
(.00) 
.00 
(.00) 
-.00 
(.00) 
.00 
(.00) 
PREFSt-1 × 
GPVt-1 
.01** 
(.00) 
-.00 
(.00) 
-.00 
(.00) 
-.00 
(.00) 
.00 
(.00) 
PREFSt-1 × 
FPVt 
.00 
(.00) 
.01* 
(.00) 
.00 
(.00) 
.00 
(.00) 
-.00 
(.00) 
PREFSt-1 × 
FPVt-1 
.01** 
(.00) 
.00 
(.00) 
-.00 
(.00) 
-.00 
(.00) 
-.00 
(.00) 
PREFSt-1 × 
FPUt 
.24** 
(.07) 
.11* 
(.05) 
.07 
(.05) 
.06 
(.03) 
-.08 
(.06) 
PREFSt-1 × 
FPUt-1 
.03 
(.05) 
-.06 
(.08) 
.10 
(.07) 
-.03 
(.04) 
.13* 
(.05) 
PREFSt-1 × 
ELECYEARt 
.05 
(.11) 
.21* 
(.09) 
.08 
(.06) 
.02 
(.04) 
.00 
(.10) 
PREFSt-1 × 
ELECPROXt 
-.01 
(.02) 
-.05 
(.03) 
-.02 
(.02) 
.00 
(.01) 
-.04* 
(.02) 
 
** p ≤ .01 , * p ≤ .05 , two-tailed tests. 
Notes. The analysis replicates the models in Table 3 while controlling for GDP (footnote 16 
in the paper). The table reports the coefficients and standard errors in parentheses for the 
interaction between public preferences and electoral incentive based on seemingly unrelated 
regression (SUR) models. The dependent variable is POLICY CHANGE (t). For the 
interpretation of the coefficients please refer to Table 1 in the paper. The definition of the 
independent variables is in the paper. 
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Table S66. SUR Models of Electoral Incentives Effects on Policy 
Representation in the US: Controlling for GDP 
 
United States 
 Cities Crime Defence Education Environment Foreign 
Aid 
Health Space Welfare 
PREFSt-1 
× 
MARGt-1  
-.02 
(.01) 
.11** 
(.03) 
-.11 
(.07) 
-.10** 
(.03) 
-.02* 
(.01) 
-.03 
(.02) 
.02 
(.03) 
-.00 
(.00) 
.05* 
(.02) 
PREFSt-1 
× LPRt 
.18 
(.17) 
.08 
(.42) 
-.69 
(.88) 
.67 
(.69) 
.26 
(.19) 
.14 
(.35) 
.36 
(.57) 
-.12 
(.08) 
-.41 
(.38) 
PREFSt-1 
× POPt 
-.01 
(.00) 
.04* 
(.02) 
-.01 
(.03) 
-.08** 
(.02) 
.00 
(.01) 
-.02 
(.01) 
-.00 
(.02) 
-.00 
(.00) 
.02 
(.01) 
PREFSt-1 
× POPt-1 
-.00 
(.00) 
.00 
(.02) 
-.02 
(.04) 
-.03 
(.02) 
-.00 
(.01) 
-.01 
(.01) 
-.03 
(.02) 
.00 
(.00) 
.01 
(.01) 
PREFSt-1 
× GPVt 
-.00 
(.00) 
.02* 
(.01) 
-.00 
(.01) 
-.04** 
(.01) 
.00 
(.00) 
-.01 
(.01) 
-.00 
(.01) 
-.00 
(.00) 
.01 
(.01) 
PREFSt-1 
× GPVt-1 
-.00 
(.00) 
.00 
(.01) 
-.01 
(.02) 
-.01 
(.01) 
-.00 
(.00) 
-.00 
(.01) 
-.02 
(.01) 
.00 
(.00) 
.00 
(.01) 
PREFSt-1 
× GPUt 
-.16* 
(.07) 
.33** 
(.11) 
.53 
(.33) 
2.61** 
(.63) 
.11 
(.12) 
-.10 
(.14) 
.37* 
(.18) 
-.04 
(.03) 
-.18 
(.19) 
PREFSt-1 
× GPUt-1 
.00 
(.05) 
-.21 
(.13) 
1.10* 
(.48) 
1.97 
(1.13) 
.44* 
(.18) 
.02 
(.16) 
.57** 
(.19) 
-.05 
(.04) 
-.27 
(.21) 
PREFSt-1 
× ELEC 
YEARt 
.12** 
(.05) 
-.30** 
(.09) 
.04 
(.23) 
-.22 
(.18) 
-.06 
(.04) 
.21 
(.12) 
.09 
(.15) 
-.03* 
(.01) 
-.33 
(.20) 
PREFSt-1 
× ELEC 
PROXt 
-.02 
(.02) 
.14** 
(.04) 
-.18** 
(.07) 
.04 
(.07) 
.02 
(.02) 
-.05 
(.04) 
-.10 
(.06) 
.01 
(.01) 
.09 
(.07) 
 
** p ≤ .01 , * p ≤ .05 , two-tailed tests. 
Notes. The analysis replicates the models in Table 3 while controlling for GDP (footnote 16 
in the paper). The table reports the coefficients and standard errors in parentheses for the 
interaction between public preferences and electoral incentive based on seemingly unrelated 
regression (SUR) models. The dependent variable is POLICY CHANGE (t). For the 
interpretation of the coefficients please refer to Table 1 in the paper. The definition of the 
independent variables is in the paper. 
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Table S67. SUR Models of Electoral Incentives Effects on Policy 
Representation in Canada: Alternative Lag Electoral Vulnerability 
 
Canada 
 Defence Education Environment Health Transport Welfare 
PREFSt-1 × 
POPt-1 
.00* 
(.00) 
.01* 
(.00) 
.00** 
(.00) 
.01 
(.00) 
-.00 
(.00) 
-.03** 
(.01) 
PREFSt-1 × 
GPVt-1 
.00** 
(.00) 
.00 
(.00) 
.00** 
(.00) 
.00 
(.00) 
-.00 
(.00) 
-.02** 
(.00) 
PREFSt-1 × 
FPVt-1 
.00** 
(.00) 
.01** 
(.00) 
.00** 
(.00) 
.00 
(.00) 
-.00 
(.00) 
-.02** 
(.00) 
PREFSt-1 × 
GPUt-1 
.03** 
(.01) 
.07 
(.06) 
.01 
(.02) 
.01 
(.04) 
.07** 
(.02) 
-.18 
(.10) 
PREFSt-1 × 
FPUt-1 
-.06** 
(.02) 
-.13 
(.12) 
-.01 
(.01) 
-.04 
(.10) 
.04 
(.10) 
-.23* 
(.10) 
 
** p ≤ .01 , * p ≤ .05 , two-tailed tests. 
Notes. The analyses re-estimate the models with previous levels of electoral vulnerability 
created without a government ideology specification (footnote 14 in the paper). The table 
reports the coefficients and standard errors in parentheses for the interaction between public 
preferences and the dynamic measures of electoral vulnerability (POP, GPV, FPV, GPU and 
FPU) based on seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) models. The dependent variable is 
POLICY CHANGE (t). For the interpretation of the coefficients please refer to Table 1 in the 
paper. The definition of the independent variables is in the paper. 
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Table S68. SUR Models of Electoral Incentives Effects on Policy 
Representation in the UK: Alternative Lag Electoral Vulnerability 
 
United Kingdom 
 Defence Education Health Pensions Roads 
PREFSt-1 × 
POPt-1 
-.01 
(.00) 
.00 
(.01) 
-.00 
(.01) 
-.00 
(.01) 
-.01 
(.00) 
PREFSt-1 × 
GPVt-1 
-.00 
(.00) 
.00 
(.00) 
-.00 
(.00) 
.00 
(.00) 
-.00 
(.00) 
PREFSt-1 × 
FPVt-1 
.01** 
(.00) 
.00 
(.00) 
-.00 
(.00) 
-.01* 
(.00) 
-.00 
(.00) 
PREFSt-1 × 
FPUt-1 
.01 
(.06) 
-.15 
(.08) 
.09 
(.07) 
-.06 
(.05) 
.21** 
(.07) 
 
** p ≤ .01 , * p ≤ .05 , two-tailed tests. 
Notes. The analyses re-estimate the models with previous levels of electoral vulnerability 
created without a government ideology specification (footnote 14 in the paper). The table 
reports the coefficients and standard errors in parentheses for the interaction between public 
preferences and the dynamic measures of electoral vulnerability (POP, GPV, FPV and FPU) 
based on seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) models. The dependent variable is POLICY 
CHANGE (t). For the interpretation of the coefficients please refer to Table 1 in the paper. 
The definition of the independent variables is in the paper. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 68 
 
Table S69. SUR Models of Electoral Incentives Effects on Policy 
Representation in the US: Alternative Lag Electoral Vulnerability 
 
United States 
 Cities Crime Defence Education Environment Foreign 
Aid 
Health Space Welfare 
PREFSt-1 
× POPt-1 
-.01 
(.00) 
.02 
(.02) 
-.02 
(.03) 
-.04 
(.02) 
.01 
(.01) 
-.02 
(.01) 
-.03 
(.02) 
-.00 
(.00) 
.02 
(.01) 
PREFSt-1 
× GPVt-1 
-.00 
(.00) 
.01 
(.01) 
-.01 
(.02) 
-.02 
(.01) 
.00 
(.00) 
-.01 
(.01) 
-.02 
(.01) 
-.00 
(.00) 
.01 
(.01) 
PREFSt-1 
× GPUt-1 
-.13 
(.07) 
-.21 
(.12) 
.64 
(.35) 
3.68** 
(.83) 
.45** 
(.14) 
-.04 
(.17) 
.37 
(.20) 
-.01 
(.03) 
-.26 
(.18) 
 
** p ≤ .01 , * p ≤ .05 , two-tailed tests. 
Notes. The analyses re-estimate the models with previous levels of electoral vulnerability 
created without a government ideology specification (footnote 14 in the paper). The table 
reports the coefficients and standard errors in parentheses for the interaction between public 
preferences and the dynamic measures of electoral vulnerability (POP, GPV and GPU) based 
on seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) models. The dependent variable is POLICY 
CHANGE (t). For the interpretation of the coefficients please refer to Table 1 in the paper. 
The definition of the independent variables is in the paper. 
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Table S70. SUR Models of Electoral Incentives Effects on Policy 
Representation in Canada: Two Lags Public Opinion and Dynamic 
Measures of Electoral Vulnerability 
 
Canada 
 Defence Education Environment Health Transport Welfare 
PREFSt-2 × 
POPt-2 
.00 
(.00) 
-.00 
(.00) 
.00** 
(.00) 
.00 
(.00) 
.01** 
(.00) 
-.00 
(.01) 
PREFSt-2 × 
GPVt-2 
.00 
(.00) 
-.01** 
(.00) 
.00** 
(.00) 
-.00 
(.00) 
.00** 
(.00) 
.00 
(.00) 
PREFSt-2 × 
FPVt-2 
.00 
(.00) 
-.01** 
(.00) 
.00** 
(.00) 
-.00 
(.00) 
.00** 
(.00) 
-.00 
(.00) 
PREFSt-2 × 
GPUt-2 
.03 
(.02) 
-.18 
(.04) 
-.00 
(.03) 
-.06 
(.03) 
-.03 
(.05) 
-.06 
(.11) 
PREFSt-2 × 
FPUt-2 
.14 
(.09) 
.11 
(.13) 
-.07** 
(.03) 
.20 
(.18) 
-.83 
(1.27) 
36.78** 
(12.14) 
 
** p ≤ .01 , * p ≤ .05 , two-tailed tests. 
Notes. The analyses test for alternative lag structures in public opinion (footnote 13 in the 
paper). The table reports the coefficients and standard errors in parentheses for the interaction 
between public preferences and the dynamic measures of electoral vulnerability (POP, GPV, 
FPV, GPU and FPU) at time (t – 2) based on seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) models. 
The dependent variable is POLICY CHANGE (t). For the interpretation of the coefficients 
please refer to Table 1 in the paper. The definition of the independent variables is in the 
paper. 
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Table S71. SUR Models of Electoral Incentives Effects on Policy 
Representation in the UK: Two Lags Public Opinion and Dynamic 
Measures of Electoral Vulnerability 
 
United Kingdom 
 Defence Education Health Pensions Roads 
PREFSt-2 × 
POPt-2 
-.01* 
(.00) 
.01 
(.01) 
-.00 
(.00) 
-.00 
(.01) 
-.01 
(.01) 
PREFSt-2 × 
GPVt-2 
-.00* 
(.00) 
.00 
(.00) 
-.00 
(.00) 
.00 
(.00) 
-.00 
(.00) 
PREFSt-2 × 
FPVt-2 
-.00 
(.00) 
.00 
(.00) 
-.00 
(.00) 
-.00 
(.00) 
-.00 
(.01) 
PREFSt-2 × 
FPUt-2 
-.00 
(.06) 
-.13* 
(.05) 
.00 
(.07) 
.00 
(.05) 
-.07 
(.08) 
 
** p ≤ .01 , * p ≤ .05 , two-tailed tests. 
Notes. The analyses test for alternative lag structures in public opinion (footnote 13 in the 
paper). The table reports the coefficients and standard errors in parentheses for the interaction 
between public preferences and the dynamic measures of electoral vulnerability (POP, GPV, 
FPV and FPU) at time (t – 2) based on seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) models. The 
dependent variable is POLICY CHANGE (t). For the interpretation of the coefficients please 
refer to Table 1 in the paper. The definition of the independent variables is in the paper. 
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Table S72. SUR Models of Electoral Incentives Effects on Policy 
Representation in the US: Two Lags Public Opinion and Dynamic 
Measures of Electoral Vulnerability 
 
United States 
 Cities Crime Defence Education Environment Foreign 
Aid 
Health Space Welfare 
PREFSt-2 
× POPt-2 
.01* 
(.00) 
-.01 
(.02) 
.08 
(.05) 
-.02 
(.03) 
-.01 
(.01) 
.02 
(.02) 
-.05* 
(.02) 
-.00 
(.00) 
-.03 
(.02) 
PREFSt-2 
× GPVt-2 
.00* 
(.00) 
-.00 
(.01) 
.04 
(.03) 
-.01 
(.01) 
-.00 
(.00) 
.01 
(.01) 
-.02* 
(.01) 
-.00 
(.00) 
-.01 
(.01) 
PREFSt-2 
× GPUt-2 
-.02 
(.05) 
-.30 
(.16) 
.97 
(.74) 
1.31 
(1.64) 
.50* 
(.22) 
.43 
(.23) 
.75* 
(.33) 
-.07 
(.04) 
.29 
(.26) 
 
** p ≤ .01 , * p ≤ .05 , two-tailed tests. 
Notes. The analyses test for alternative lag structures in public opinion (footnote 13 in the 
paper). The table reports the coefficients and standard errors in parentheses for the interaction 
between public preferences and the dynamic measures of electoral vulnerability (POP, GPV 
and GPU) at time (t – 2) based on seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) models. The 
dependent variable is POLICY CHANGE (t). For the interpretation of the coefficients please 
refer to Table 1 in the paper. The definition of the independent variables is in the paper. 
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Table S73. OLS Models of Electoral Incentives Effects on Collective 
Representation in Canada 
 
 Social 
Domains 
Combined 
Vote margin (t – 1) .17** 
(.03) 
Electoral risk (t) -2.43 
(2.76) 
Government popularity (t) -.04 
(.05) 
Government popularity (t – 1) -.00 
(.07) 
Government potential vulnerability (t) -.02 
(.03) 
Government potential vulnerability (t – 1) .00 
(.04) 
Formateur potential vulnerability (t) -.03 
(.03) 
Formateur potential vulnerability (t – 1) -.02 
(.04) 
Government potential uncertainty (t) .21 
(.54) 
Government potential uncertainty (t – 1) .49 
(.57) 
Formateur potential uncertainty (t) 1.12 
(.70) 
Formateur potential uncertainty (t – 1) .53 
(.72) 
Election year (t) -2.12* 
(.86) 
Electoral proximity (t) .29 
(.27) 
 
** p ≤ .01 , * p ≤ .05 , two-tailed tests. 
 
Notes. The analyses test whether electoral incentives have an effect on collective representation, 
whereby social domains are taken together. The table reports the coefficients and standard errors in 
parentheses for the interaction between public opinion and electoral incentive based on OLS models. 
The dependent variable is POLICY CHANGE (t). For the interpretation of the coefficients please refer 
to Table 1 in the paper. The definition of the independent variables is in the paper. 
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Table S74. OLS Models of Electoral Incentives Effects on Collective 
Representation in the UK 
 
 Social 
Domains 
Combined 
Vote margin (t – 1) -.29* 
(.11) 
Electoral risk (t) 3.62 
(2.45) 
Government popularity (t) -.06 
(.07) 
Government popularity (t – 1) .15 
(.07) 
Government potential vulnerability (t) -.02 
(.03) 
Government potential vulnerability (t – 1) .08 
(.04) 
Formateur potential vulnerability (t) -.08 
(.04) 
Formateur potential vulnerability (t – 1) .08 
(.05) 
Formateur potential uncertainty (t) -.25 
(.46) 
Formateur potential uncertainty (t – 1) 1.26** 
(.22) 
Election year (t) .52 
(.69) 
Electoral proximity (t) .10 
(.20) 
 
** p ≤ .01 , * p ≤ .05 , two-tailed tests. 
 
Notes. The analyses test whether electoral incentives have an effect on collective 
representation, whereby social domains are taken together. The table reports the coefficients 
and standard errors in parentheses for the interaction between public opinion and electoral 
incentive based on OLS models. The dependent variable is POLICY CHANGE (t). For the 
interpretation of the coefficients please refer to Table 1 in the paper. The definition of the 
independent variables is in the paper. 
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Table S75. OLS Models of Electoral Incentives Effects on Collective 
Representation in the US 
 
 Social 
Domains 
Combined 
Vote margin (t – 1) -.05 
(.09) 
Electoral risk (t) .97 
(1.31) 
Government popularity (t) -.03 
(.06) 
Government popularity (t – 1) -.01 
(.06) 
Government potential vulnerability (t) -.02 
(.03) 
Government potential vulnerability (t – 1) -.01 
(.03) 
Government potential uncertainty (t) 1.05 
(.60) 
Government potential uncertainty (t – 1) .47 
(.59) 
Election year (t) -.75 
(.48) 
Electoral proximity (t) .05 
(.19) 
 
** p ≤ .01 , * p ≤ .05 , two-tailed tests. 
 
Notes. The analyses test whether electoral incentives have an effect on collective 
representation, whereby social domains are taken together. The table reports the coefficients 
and standard errors in parentheses for the interaction between public opinion and electoral 
incentive based on OLS models. The dependent variable is POLICY CHANGE (t). For the 
interpretation of the coefficients please refer to Table 1 in the paper. The definition of the 
independent variables is in the paper. 
 
 
